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THE NEW BAILMENTS
Danielle D’Onfro*
Abstract: The rise of cloud computing has dramatically changed how consumers and firms
store their belongings. Property that owners once managed directly now exists primarily on
infrastructure maintained by intermediaries. Consumers entrust their photos to Apple instead
of scrapbooks; businesses put their documents on Amazon’s servers instead of in file cabinets;
seemingly everything runs in the cloud. Were these belongings tangible, the relationship
between owner and intermediary would be governed by the common-law doctrine of bailment.
Bailments are mandatory relationships formed when one party entrusts their property to
another. Within this relationship, the bailees owe the bailors a duty of care and may be liable
if they fail to return the property. The parties can use contracts to customize the relationship
but not to disclaim the duty of care entirely.
Tracing the law of bailment relationships from its ancient roots to the present, this Article
argues that cloud storage should be understood as potentially creating a bailment relationship.
Though the kind of stored property has changed over time, the parties’ expectations and
incentives have not: people entrusting their property to others expect that it will be kept
reasonably safe. Although cloud storage is not new, courts have had scant opportunity to
analyze the obligations of cloud storage providers. The best explanation for this lack of case
law is the decline of litigation, the rise of arbitration, federal diversity jurisdiction, and the
ever-growing dominance of contracts, not that bailment has no role in cloud storage.
Recognizing cloud storage as a potential bailment would have significant implications.
Most immediately, it would suggest that some provisions in many cloud storage services’
contracts are unenforceable or enforceable only after fact-intensive judicial review. A handcollected dataset of fifty-eight cloud storage contracts reveals that most have included general
disclaimers for any liability for lost data that are inconsistent with the duty of care that is the
foundation of the law of bailment. In addition, understanding cloud storage as a bailment would
have important implications for both the law of consumer protection and Fourth Amendment
protections.
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INTRODUCTION
To have property is to need storage. Few of us always keep all our
property in our literal possession. Storage solves this logistics nightmare.
It allows owners to accumulate resources for future use and to preserve
the past, and thereby reap the benefits of private property.
Storing property in the care of others complicates the situation. At
common law, the doctrine of bailment covered transactions in which
people delivered property to others on the understanding that the
recipients would later return the property.1 The recipient of property
becomes a bailee and the deliverer the bailor. The law of bailment
determines who bears the risk of loss if the bailee cannot return the
property in the condition received and supplies the procedural rules of

1. JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 389 (4th ed. 2007); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS: WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND
FOREIGN LAW 1–2 (1832). There are competing theories about whether contract or tort provides the
best theoretical basis for bailment doctrine.
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who has the burden of explaining what happened to the property.2 And
finally, the law of bailment may help determine when third parties like
creditors and law enforcement can access the property.3
The modern doctrine of bailment has its roots in the Middle Ages,
although the concept is much older than that.4 Bailment has evolved to
accommodate new technologies, understandings of ownership, and legal
procedures.5 The question animating this Article is whether the law of
bailment can and should accommodate the latest of these shifts: the rise
of digital assets and cloud storage. Although cloud storage was already
growing rapidly before 2020, it exploded after the pandemic shifted many
companies to remote work.6 Digital assets are poised to play an everincreasing role both in firm value and in individual’s daily lives.
Moreover, Justice Gorsuch has recently suggested that the answer to this
question may determine whether the Fourth Amendment protects files
stored on popular services7 like Gmail and Dropbox.
From ocean liners to FedEx distribution centers, safe deposit boxes to
dry cleaners, parking lots to lending between friends, bailments and their
kin are everywhere. As a relationship—and bailments are fundamentally
relationships—bailment is so common, and its basic rules so intuitive, that
there is no need to think about the contours of the relationship in most

2. See Edward Brodkey, Practical Aspects of Bailment Proof, 45 MARQ. L. REV. 531 (1962)
(surveying the procedural rules of bailment).
3. See infra Part V.
4. See infra section I.A.
5. See infra section I.C.
6. Aaron Tilley, A Cloud Surge Lifts Amazon, Microsoft and Google’s Results, WALL ST. J. (July
31, 2020, 8:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-businesses-multiyear-bets-fuel-cloud-growth11596196893 [https://perma.cc/4HZ5-YNLB]; Angus Loten, Cloud Spending Hits Record Amid
Economic Fallout from Covid-19, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2020, 6:49 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cloud-spending-hits-record-amid-economic-fallout-from-covid-1911596494981 [https://perma.cc/TG89-WR33].
7. Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268–69 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
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cases.8 Trust lies at the core of the bailment relationship.9 If you lend your
bicycle to your roommates, you trust that they will take care of it while
they have it and return it to you when you ask for it. Without that trust,
you would, hopefully, not lend the bicycle. Bailment puts the force of law
behind that trust, elevating it into a duty of care that the bailee owes the
bailor. By giving trust the force of law, bailment is a protective doctrine
that transcends the traditional boundaries of contract, property, and tort.
Traditionally, the law of bailment has only applied to tangible goods
in large part because it developed in a world with few intangibles and
nothing approximating digital data.10 However, as people substitute
digital goods for tangible goods, this limitation no longer makes sense.
There is no agreed-upon term for these digital substitutes.11 For the sake
of convenience, this Article uses the term “digital property assets” to refer
to electronically stored files. These files may be property, even if their
content is not.12 Indeed, digital property need not be “Property,” in the
strongest sense of the word. This Article will show that these files bear

8. Thirty years ago, Richard Helmholz noted that bailments had received little scholarly attention
since the 1930s. R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform
Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 100 (1992). Despite remaining a common
source of litigation in courts, the common law of bailment has not received much scholarly attention
since Helmholz’s observation. The notable exceptions are Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 811–20 (2001), and Christopher M. Newman,
Bailment and the Property/Contract Interface (George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. LS 15-12,
2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2654988 [https://perma.cc/V9SWQV7Y]. Earlier treatments of the doctrine are primarily historical. See Samuel Stoljar, The Early
History of Bailment, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 5, 5 (1957); Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Carrier’s Liability:
Its History, 11 HARV. L. REV. 158 (1897). Statutory interventions in the law have also received little
attention. For example, there is a whole article of the Uniform Commercial Code, article 7, on
Documents of Title, which covers commercial bailment relationships under documents of title. U.C.C.
§ 7 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2003). Its revision in 2003 and prompt adoption in all fifty
states plus the District of Columbia received virtually no attention in law reviews. See UCC Article
7, Documents of Title, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=9893636e-0046-498a-8ed9-3d57c192489a (last visited Feb. 1, 2022).
9. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 108; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 911 (KB).
10. PRINCIPLES FOR A DATA ECONOMY: DATA TRANSACTIONS AND DATA RIGHTS 6 (NEIL COHEN
& CHRISTIANE WENDEHORST, AM. L. INST. & EUR. L. INST. 2020) (“With the emergence of the data
economy, however, tradeable items often cannot readily be classified as such goods or rights, and
they are arguably not services. They are often simply ‘data’.”).
11. Some commentators refer to these files as “digital assets.” See Natalie M. Banta, Property
Interests in Digital Assets: The Rise of Digital Feudalism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1105–08
(2017) (arguing that digital asset contracts reveal an assumption that users of email, social media, and
other services have some form of property that the contract modifies); David Horton, The Stored
Communications Act and Digital Assets, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (2014).
12. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Appetite for Destruction: Symbolic and Structural Facets of the Right
to Destroy Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 547 (2017) (“Even if data itself is not
property, the digital boxes that contain it might be.”).
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sufficient similarity to traditional chattel property such that the commonlaw doctrine of bailment should apply.13
To see a snapshot of how cloud storage companies understand their
service in relation to the doctrine of bailment at this moment in time, this
Article relies on a hand-collected dataset of fifty-eight contracts from
fifty-four cloud storage providers. Contracts in this dataset are coded for
language relating to the risk of data loss. Only one contract in the data set
explicitly contemplates bailment.14 Although most of these contracts do
not discuss bailment by name, they have terms that implicate the doctrine.
In the dataset, fifty-two contracts had one or more provisions attempting
to disclaim liability for lost data. Several contracts went further,
commanding the client to maintain back-up copies of the data. A few even
reserved the option to delete customer data at their discretion. Caps on
liability for lost data are common.
The exculpatory clauses in this data set are typical of those found
across consumer contracts more generally.15 These clauses attempt to pare
back, and even eliminate, the many private law doctrines that constrain
contracts in the name of consumer protection.16 When applied to
bailments, exculpatory clauses vitiate the duty of care that would apply if
the facts of the relationship animating the contract created a bailment.17 If
the stored assets were tangible, a company contracting with the public
would likely not be able to make such an end-run around bailment law.18
Digital assets should be no different. This Article builds on the
growing literature arguing that “computer code that is designed to act like
real world property” should “be regulated and protected like real world

13. As drafted, some statutory formulations of bailment may be limited to tangible property. This
constraint is not inherent to the doctrine itself. See infra section I.B.
14. Efforts to find historical versions of the contracts in the dataset produced very limited results.
Of the historical drafts available, only one referenced bailment directly. See AWS Terms of Service,
infra note 300.
15. Ryan Martins, Shannon Price & John Fabian Witt, Contract’s Revenge: The Waiver Society
and the Death of Tort, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1265, 1280–82 (2020); see also MICHAEL OVERLY &
JAMES R. KALYVAS, SOFTWARE AGREEMENTS LINE BY LINE 69–83 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining that
broad disclaimers of liability are common in software contracts).
16. See generally Martins et al., supra note 15 (explaining the rise of exculpatory clauses that limit
tort liability).
17. See A. Darby Dickerson, Note, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability in
Commercial Bailments, 41 VAND. L. REV. 129, 131 (1988).
18. Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 446 A.2d 799, 804 (Conn. 1982) (finding that
parties cannot disclaim the bailment relationship by contract); Am. Nursery Prods., Inc. v. Indian
Wells Orchards, 115 Wash. 2d 217, 230–31, 797 P.2d 477, 485 (1990) (same); Ellerman v. Atlanta
Am. Motor Hotel Corp., 191 S.E.2d 295, 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (same).
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property.”19 In his critique of the tech industry, Adrian Daub argues that
“[f]etishizing the novelty of the problem” that tech is attempting to solve,
“deprives the public of the analytic tools that it has previously brought to
bear on similar problems.”20 He explains that “standard analytic tools
largely apply just fine” despite the novelty of new technology.21 One such
analytic tool is the private law, particularly as conceived in the law of
bailment.
The law of bailment exists independent of the contracts between tech
companies and their clients. As Natalie Banta has explained, “[t]he
concept of property and ownership goes beyond the terms of a contract—
contracts cannot rewrite an entire system of property for digital assets.”22
Cloud storage is the safe deposit box of the twenty-first century, and upon
closer inspection, the law of safe deposit boxes maps nicely onto cloud
storage.23 This conclusion stakes out a role for property doctrine as
mandatory law notwithstanding broad freedom to contract. Joshua A.T.
Fairfield has argued that, “the law of contract and the law of property
traditionally balance each other” with contract facilitating customization
and property limiting the inefficiencies that customization can impose on
assets.24 He argued that the contracts governing virtual environments
attempt to eliminate the checks and balances traditionally posed by
property law.25 Bailment is one such check—it secures digital assets
against uncertainty and loss from firms with technological, informational,
and bargaining advantages.26
The common law of bailment is an essential framework for
understanding cloud storage even if cloud storage manages to evade
19. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2005); see also Banta,
supra note 11; Colin P. Marks, Online Terms as in Terrorem Devices, 78 MD. L. REV. 247 (2019).
20. ADRIAN DAUB, WHAT TECH CALLS THINKING: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTELLECTUAL
BEDROCK OF SILICON VALLEY 5 (2020).
21. Id.; see also Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1050 (“Even where there has been some recognition
that virtual property is somehow ‘different,’ no clear articulation of that difference has been offered.”).
22. Banta, supra note 11, at 1107.
23. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 239, 244 (2005) (exploring how the internet has matured with a “set of legal
rules . . . that have granted . . . actors broad freedom of action or exempted them from rules that
govern analogous conduct outside cyberspace”).
24. Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1051–52; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26–27
(2000).
25. Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1083–84.
26. See Caitlin J. Akins, Note, Conversion of Digital Property: Protecting Consumers in the Age
of Technology, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 215, 218 (2010) (explaining that internet-based services
create three imbalances in favor of the service provider: technological imbalance, information
imbalance, and bargaining imbalance).
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adjudication in common law courts. To date, the public has heard of few
large-scale losses of cloud-based files. If and when that changes, the
political economy may demand statutory ground rules for cloud storage
as there are for self-storage and commercial warehousing. To integrate
cleanly with other areas of law, notably contract, any statutory law of
cloud storage should start with the principles of bailment.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explains the law of bailment.
Next, Part II turns to cloud storage, explaining how it works, arguing that
the stored files are analogous to chattel property, and finally exploring the
risks that cloud storage presents. Part III then makes the case that the
common law doctrine of bailment covers cloud storage. To see how cloud
storage companies view their bailment liability, Part IV is an empirical
look at cloud storage contracts as they exist in the middle of 2020. Finally,
Part V explores the structural barriers to recognizing cloud storage as a
bailment in the law and the implication of the uncertainty around cloud
storage for other areas of the law including the Fourth Amendment and
ownership more broadly.
I.

THE LAW OF BAILMENT

A few themes animate the heart of bailment doctrine. The first is that
trust is the lifeblood of the bailment relationship. The second is that
bailment is a mandatory doctrine—courts will look through contracts to
the facts to determine whether a bailment exists. And the third, is that the
bailment doctrine puts liability on the least cost avoider, especially in
cases where the bailee has a significant informational advantage over the
bailor.
A.

A Brief History of Bailment

For several millennia, bailment has been a body of law that governs
the relationship between the owner of a property and the person storing
that property. It appears in the Code of Hammurabi27 and Roman law in
forms not much different from the modern common law doctrine.28 For
example, section 125 of the Code of Hammurabi says:
If a man give anything of his on deposit, and at the place of
deposit either by burglary or pillage he suffer loss in common

27. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §§ 112, 120–125, translated in ROBERT FRANCIS HARPER, THE
CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON, ABOUT 2250 B.C., at 39, 41–43 (Robert Francis Harper
trans., 2d ed. Univ. of Chi. Press 1904).
28. Charles Sumner Lobingier, The Common Law’s Indebtedness to Rome, 11 A.B.A. J. 265, 266–
67 (1925).
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with the owner of the house, the owner of the house who has been
negligent and has lost what was given to him on deposit shall
make good (the loss) and restore (it) to the owner of the
goods . . . .29
Then, as now, the persistent question is who bears the risk of loss.
The facts that give rise to this question are diverse. In his commentary
on English law, Henry de Bracton sorted these facts into six categories,
each with its own nuance but retaining the core idea that someone holding
another person’s property owes that person a duty to return the property
unharmed.30 Writing in Coggs v. Bernard31 in 1703, Chief Justice Holt
elaborated on Bracton’s taxonomy.32 According to Holt and Bracton, the
traditional categories of bailment are bare naked bailments or depositum;
gratuitous loans to friends or commodatum; hired goods or location et
conductio; pawn and pledge or vadium; common carriers including
tradespeople; and volunteers or mandatum.33 This taxonomy remains
influential to both courts34 and commentators35 more than three centuries

29. THE CODE OF HAMMURABI § 125, translated in HARPER, supra note 27, at 43. Henry de
Bracton, writing in the thirteenth century, and Chief Justice John Holt, writing in the eighteenth
century, give a nearly identical formulation of the law. See 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 284 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1977);
Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 110; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 913–14 (KB).
30. BRACTON, supra note 29, at 284.
31. (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107; 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (KB) (also called Coggs v. Barnard in some
manuscripts).
32. Id. at 109–14; 2 Ld. Raym at 912–19; Stoljar, supra note 8, at 22 n.69 (explaining that Holt
borrowed his terms from Bracton).
33. Coggs, 92 Eng. Rep. at 109–14; 2 Ld. Raym at 912–19; BRACTON, supra note 29, at 284; see
also infra section I.C.
34. See, e.g., Ferrick Excavating & Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co., 484 A.2d 744, 747–48
(Pa. 1984) (relying on Holt’s taxonomy on bailments in Coggs); Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine,
Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 885 (7th Cir. 1993) (same); Llamera v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 593, 598 (1988)
(citing Coggs for the proposition that reliance alone is sufficient to create a bailment); Com. Molasses
Corp. v. N.Y. Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 110 (1941) (“Petitioner apparently does not challenge
the distinction which for more than two centuries since Coggs v. Bernard, supra, has been taken
between common carriers and those whom the law leaves free to regulate their mutual rights and
obligations by private arrangement . . . .”). Louisiana civil law cases retain Bracton’s nomenclature.
Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So.2d 435, 437 (La. Ct. App. 1957)
(explaining that bailment “is quite similar in many respects to a civil law ‘deposit’”).
35. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 1, at 3–5 (incorporating Holt’s categories into his own framework);
Kurt Philip Autor, Note, Bailment Liability: Toward a Standard of Reasonable Care, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2117, 2127 (1988) (describing competing classification regimes). But see Stoljar, supra note 8,
at 16 (criticizing Bracton’s taxonomy, which was the foundation of Holt’s, as neither “enlightening”
nor “clear”); Dickerson, supra note 17, at 135 (describing Holt’s framework as “obsolete”).
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later, although it is yielding to simpler frameworks.36 Still, the breadth of
these categories reveals the wide reach of bailment doctrine.
To the extent that bailment has a reputation for being abstruse,37 its
old procedure is partly to blame. At common law, bailees faced liability
under four actions: detinue,38 account, case, and later, conversion.39
Detinue, in particular, invited shenanigans.40 But the core principle of
bailees owing bailors a duty of care has remained constant. Even where
agreements are silent on any standard of care, the law has long imposed
an obligation on bailees to perform their services with care.
At common law, if bailees could not return the property, bailors were
entitled to a remedy unless the bailees could successfully plead an excuse.
Acceptable excuses shifted over time. Bailees could claim an accidental
loss defense in the fourteenth century,41 but appear to have been strictly
liable for losses for all losses except those “caused by act of God or the
king’s enemies” by the fifteenth century.42 But even then, this strict rule
was merely the default. Bailees could and did accept bailments on less
stringent terms, notably on a promise to treat the bailors’ goods with

36. This more modern framework simplifies Holt’s six categories into three: bailments for sole
benefit of the bailor, bailments for the sole benefit of the bailee, and bailments for mutual benefit. 8A
AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 7 (2021). Some courts further simplify these categories into only two:
bailments for hire and gratuitous bailments. Id.; see also Gulf Transit Co. v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl.
183, 196 (1908) (explaining that contracts between the government and “corporations or individuals
engaged in the business of receiving and caring for the property of others either for the purpose of
hire or for the performance of work thereon” are “in the class of mutual benefit bailments”); Gray v.
Snow King Resort, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 1473, 1478 (D. Wyo. 1995) (incorporating the simpler bailment
for mutual benefit/gratuitous bailment framework into Wyoming law).
37. George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 205 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Cal. 1949) (describing case law as
“conflicting and confusing”).
38. A writ of detinue would send the sheriff to order the bailee to return the bailed property.
Holdsworth described detinue and debt as “twin actions,” analogizing the bailee’s obligation to return
property to the borrower’s obligation to repay money. 3 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 348 (1923).
39. Beale, supra note 8, at 159; see also, BAKER, supra note 1, at 396 (recounting a bailee being
held liable in conversion when he opened sealed boxes of silver and spent the coin).
40. Bailees would mostly plead non detinet (he does not withhold) when they no longer had
possession of the property. The plea of non detinet proved short-lived, perhaps because it all but
invited opportunism. For example, a bailee holding wine might drink it and then truthfully be able to
plead non detinet. It remains unclear how courts handled this situation. See YB 20 Hen. 6, fol. 16,
Brown, pl. 2 (1442) (“If you bail me a tun of wine and I drink it with good company, you cannot
detinue for it because the wine is no longer of this world.”).
41. BAKER, supra note 1, at 392.
42. Id. There is disagreement among scholars about whether bailee liability was arguably an earlier
form of strict liability. Id. at 395; see also O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 167 (2d ed. 1909).
But see Stoljar, supra note 8, at 14 (arguing that bailee’s liability is better conceived of as “qualified”
rather than “strict” except in the case of common carriers); Beale, supra note 8, at 162 (questioning
the evidence that bailees generally faced strict liability).
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reasonable care or the same care that he treated his own.43 Under these
early exculpatory clauses, bailees were still liable if their negligence
caused injury to the bailed property.44 There is no evidence that a bailee
could completely disclaim their duty of care.
Conversely, bailors have long been able to use contracts to secure
greater protection from their bailees. At common law, such a bailor
needed a “special undertaking” in which the bailee would promise to keep
the goods “safely and securely.”45 Writing in Coggs, Justice Gould
explained that payment of a premium was evidence of this higher
undertaking.46
Over time, the default duty of care relaxed leading to uncertainty
about whether the default duty of care is negligence or gross negligence.47
This uncertainty persists in modern case law, but the majority rule is that
ordinary negligence is the duty of care.48 Either way, the duty of care
remains a constant in the law.
Today, much of the common law of bailment has been codified. There
is no comprehensive bailment statute, but rather industry-specific
formulations scattered across the state and federal code. Most, but not all,
of these statutes preserve the bailment relationship where it would apply
at common law. As much as bailment is a set of rules facilitating efficient
commercial transactions, it is also a consumer protection law that puts the
threat of liability behind inducements of trust.
Depending on the value of the stored property, the business risk of
bailment liability may be undesirable if not intolerable. It is unsurprising
then that industries like self-storage have lobbied for statutes mitigating
this risk or at least providing more certainty than the common law about
what risk they bear.49 Industry-driven interventions limiting bailees’
liability take a few common forms. The first, and most extreme, are

43. BAKER, supra note 1, at 392.
44. Id. at 395.
45. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 107–08; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 909–10 (KB).
46. Id. at 107; 2 Ld. Raym. at 909.
47. By the eighteenth century, whether the default standard of liability was negligence or gross
negligence remains unclear. Justice Gould explained:
So if goods are deposited with a friend, and are stolen from him, no action will lie. But there will
be a difference in that case upon the evidence, how the matter appears; if they were stolen by
reason of a gross neglect in the bailee, the trust will not save him from an action, otherwise if
there be no gross neglect.
Id. Holt argued that the standard was gross neglect but conceded that there was a case against him.
Id. at 110; 2 Ld. Raym. at 910.
48. See generally Helmholz, supra note 8 (tracing the uncertainty).
49. Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property Rights, Property Wrongs, and Chattel Dispossession Under
Self-Storage Leases, 78 TENN. L. REV. 1015, 1020 (2011).
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statutes that prevent the creation of a bailment where the facts would
create a bailment at common law. The moving and self-storage industry
has succeeded in winning these statutes in a handful of states.50
The second statutory intervention in bailments is caps on bailee
liability for lost and damaged property. One form of this intervention
shields bailees from accidentally providing more insurance than they were
intended to provide. For example, California, Guam, Montana, Oklahoma,
and South Dakota have statutes that cap bailees’ liability at “the amount
which [they are] informed by the depositor, or ha[ve] reason to suppose,
the thing deposited to be worth.”51 A more protective form of this
intervention allows bailees to unilaterally cap their liability. Hotels in
every state benefit from these statutes,52 although some states decline to
extend the cap to losses attributable to the hotel’s negligence.53 These
“innkeepers’ statutes” undo the common law rules that included
innkeepers among common carriers held strictly liable for losses of their
client’s property.54
The third form of statutory intervention attempts, with mixed success,
to resolve some of the uncertainty at common law over whether and how
the parties can use contracts to specify the bailee’s duty of care.55 The
most significant version of this intervention is in article 7 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which governs documents of title, including
warehouse receipts and bills of lading, for personal property. In governing
warehouse receipts, U.C.C. article 7 covers much of the commercial
activity that would otherwise fall under the law of bailments for hire.56
U.C.C. section 7-204(a) sets a warehouse’s baseline duty of care at
“damages for loss of or injury to the goods caused by its failure to exercise
care with regard to the goods that a reasonably careful person would

50. See infra section I.C. See generally Jones, supra note 49 (detailing the statutory interventions
in the self-storage industry).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1840 (West 2021); 18 GUAM CODE ANN. § 41108 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 70-6-204 (2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 460 (2021).
52. Dickerson, supra note 17, at 145 n.113 (cataloging innkeepers statutes in all fifty states).
53. Compare Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas, 488 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
(innkeeper statute does not shield hotel for liability for negligence), with Associated Mills, Inc. v.
Drake Hotel, Inc., 334 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (liability cap applies notwithstanding the
hotel’s negligence).
54. See supra section I.C.
55. See Hugh Evander Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Negligence,
20 HARV. L. REV. 297, 299 (1907) (“Almost unanimously it is held that bailees may increase the duty
which they would otherwise be under, but to what extent they may decrease that duty is not clear.”);
Note, Validity of an Ordinary Bailment Contract Limiting Liability of Bailee for Negligence, 86 U.
PA. L. REV. 772, 773–76 (1938).
56. U.C.C. § 7 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010).
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exercise under similar circumstances.”57 It then provides that “[u]nless
otherwise agreed, the warehouse is not liable for damages that could not
have been avoided by the exercise of that care,”58 the implication being
that the parties can contract for the bailee to bear a higher duty of care.59
The U.C.C. also endorses liability caps providing, “[d]amages may be
limited by a term in the warehouse receipt or storage agreement,” except
when the warehouse converts the property for its own use.60 Although
courts do tend to enforce damages caps that comply with U.C.C. § 7204(b) against “sophisticated” parties,61 they still occasionally hold that
damages caps are unconscionable against consumers.62 Interpreting
section 7-204 in OFI International, Inc. v. Port Newark Refrigerated
Warehouse,63 the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey explained that “[w]hile a common carrier and a bailee cannot
‘effectuate a complete exemption from liability for losses proximately
resulting from the negligence of the carrier or bailee,’ nothing prevents
them from placing limitations on that liability.”64
B.

Modern Bailments at Common Law

Bailment is the separation of actual possession from other property
rights.65 Bailors retain most of the rights in the delivered goods.66
Notwithstanding the bailment, the bailors retain the right to control the
property.67 To create the archetypical bailment, Holt’s “bare naked
57. Id. § 7-204(a).
58. Id.
59. See id. § 7-204(b).
60. Id.
61. Coutinho & Ferrostaal Inc. v. M/V Fed. Rhine, 799 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554 (D. Md. 2011); see
also Anthony B. Schutz, Documents of Title, 67 BUS. LAW. 1293, 1296 (2012).
62. See, e.g., Jasphy v. Osinsky, 834 A.2d 426, 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding a $1
cap on damages in an adhesion contract between a furrier and a consumer to be unconscionable); see
also Drew L. Kershen, Article 7: Documents of Title—2003 Developments, 59 BUS. LAW. 1629, 1633
(2004).
63. OFI Int’l, Inc. v. Port Newark Refrigerated Warehouse, No. 11-CV-06376, 2015 WL 140134,
at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2015).
64. Id. at *9 (quoting Silvestri v. S. Orange Storage Corp., 81 A.2d 502, 504 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1951)).
65. See Silvers v. Silvers, 999 P.2d 786, 793 (Alaska 2000) (“Where the plaintiff transfers only the
possessory interest in her property to the defendant, a bailment is created.”); see also, BAKER, supra
note 1, at 389. The separation of possession and property occurred gradually.
66. This interest may be ownership, but it may also be something less. Merrill & Smith, supra note
8, at 812 (explaining that bailment is a transfer of possession with the bailor retaining the other in rem
property rights associated with ownership including the right to alienate or devise).
67. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-705 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (entitling sellers to stop
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bailment” or “depositum,”68 the owner of goods delivers it to another
party, paying a fee for that party to store the good. Many jurisdictions
would call this a bailment for hire or bailment for mutual benefit, even if
the payment takes the form of goodwill or another benefit.69
Some degree of bailor control does not relieve bailees of their duty of
care. The question of how much control the alleged bailor can retain
without breaking the bailment relationship will become important when
we turn to cloud storage in Part IV.
As discussed above, the contours of the duty of care that bailees owe
bailors vary somewhat among states.70 Today, the majority rule is that
bailees are liable when their negligence harms the property.71 Tom Merrill
and Henry Smith argue that setting the default rule at reasonable care may
be an example of the law “maximiz[ing] the joint value associated with
the bailment”72 by adopting “the standard that the parties would most
likely agree upon if they could costlessly negotiate over the issue.”73 This
standard sets the level of insurance that the bailee provides to the bailor.74
Setting a default rule at negligence but allowing customization leads
to efficient results where the bailment reflects a dickered agreement. The
default rule falters in high-volume situations where the bailee offers its
services only according to a standard form contract—for example, coat
checks, dry cleaners, and parking lots.75 Here, the presumption of
efficiency is especially weak where the bailors have no choice among

delivery of goods by non-carrier bailees provided that they “so notify as to enable the bailee by
reasonable diligence to prevent delivery of the goods” up until the point that the bailee notifies the
buyer that the bailee holds the goods for the buyer).
68. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 109; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 912–13 (KB).
69. See Meriwether Cnty. v. Creamer, 247 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (loaning a firetruck
for demonstration was not a gratuitous bailment because “it was for the benefit of the county to
develop civil defense units”).
70. See Helmholz, supra note 8, at 134 (arguing that the persistence of “contract and conversion
theories in preventing implementation of a uniform standard of reasonable care as the invariable rule
of bailment liability”).
71. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 77 (2021).
72. Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 814.
73. Id. at 813–14 (citing Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89–90 (1989)).
74. Some courts have denied that bailees are insurers, explaining that their liability stems from
contract, negligence, or conversion and not from some kind of strict liability for loss of the bailed
goods. See Tremaroli v. Delta Airlines, 458 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (Civ. Ct. 1983) (“It is well settled that
a bailee is not an insurer.”); Helmholz, supra note 8, at 109.
75. Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 814.
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bailees and where the cost of foregoing the bailment is high.76 Indeed, if
any bargaining could occur, it’s not clear that it would be worth the time.77
The law of bailment teeters between property, contract, and tort,
creating three competing theories of bailees’ duty of care: contracts,
property, and conversion.78 These competing theories muddle analysis of
the extent to which a bailee can customize their duty of care with
contract.79 Where there is a contract, modern courts typically enforce it
according to its terms,80 with limits on modifications to the duty of care.81
Bailors who require greater protection when entrusting their goods to
others can contract accordingly. Agreements that shift risk away from the
bailee are more suspect, but often still enforceable.82
The duty of care increases when the bailee redelivers the property to
the bailor. Courts continue to hold bailees strictly liable for misdelivery
of the bailed property.83 This rule places liability on the least cost avoider
76. For example, we might assume that a party will accept unsatisfactory terms on the agreement
to use a coat check at a theater if the alternative is to skip the performance thereby wasting the value
of the tickets, and perhaps also transit, childcare, and time.
77. See id. at 817 (“[I]t is doubtful that very many bailors would have an incentive to inform
themselves about benefits and costs of agreeing to a modification of the default standard of
care . . . .”).
78. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 407 (“‘[C]ontract’ and ‘tort’ still overlap in cases of bailees,
surgeons, and others whose duties to be careful arise both by reason of their physical nexus with the
plaintiff or his property and by reason of their dealings with him.”); Helmholz, supra note 8, at 134
(explaining the influence of property, contract, and tort on bailment doctrine); see also Merrill &
Smith, supra note 8, at 811–12 (explaining the disagreement about where bailment fits into the private
law); RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.1 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed.
1975) (“There has, however, been a vigorous dissent to this insistence on the contractual element in
bailments.”). Occasionally, case outcomes turn on which theory courts apply. For example, in some
jurisdictions actions in contract and actions in negligence carry different statutes of limitations. See
Baratta v. Kozlowski, 464 N.Y.S.2d 803, 809 (App. Div. 1983); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, SELECTED
TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS: FIVE LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
FEBRUARY 2, 3, 4, 5, AND 6, 1953, at 434 (1953); see also Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman
River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir. 2001) (explaining that under Missouri law, suits
for breach of bailment contract allocate the burden of proof differently from other suits for breach of
contract). But see Knight v. H & H Chevrolet, 337 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Neb. 1983) (putting the burden
on bailees to prove that they were not negligent in cases sounding in both contract and tort); Coons v.
First Nat’l Bank of Philmont, 218 N.Y.S. 189 (App. Div. 1926) (holding that a bank is not liable to
the daughter of a depositor for the loss of a safety deposit box on the grounds that there was no contract
between the bank and the daughter); William King Laidlaw, Principles of Bailment, 16 CORNELL
L.Q. 286, 289–91 (discussing Coons).
79. BROWN, supra note 78, § 11.5.
80. Id.
81. Even in 1955, the Supreme Court recognized that one justification for disfavoring exculpatory
clauses was “to protect those in need of goods or services from being overreached by others who have
power to drive hard bargains.” Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 91 (1955).
82. See Dickerson, supra note 17, at 138 (cataloging courts’ treatment of exculpatory clauses in
bailment contracts).
83. Helmholz, supra note 8, at 124–29.
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since only the bailee can confirm the identity of the person receiving the
property upon the termination of the bailment.84
Even where a bailee’s duty of care is mere negligence, in many
jurisdictions procedural rules offer bailors greater protection than
plaintiffs in other negligence actions.85 In many jurisdictions damage to
property entrusted to a bailee creates a rebuttable presumption that the
bailee was negligent.86 The burden of proof then shifts to the bailee who
must either refute the bailor’s allegation or prove some justification or
excuse for why the condition of the goods has changed.87 If the bailee
cannot adequately explain what happened, the bailor wins.88 Indeed, some
courts take bailees’ uncertainty about what harm befell the goods in their
care as evidence that they failed to satisfy their duty of care.89 If the bailee
can show what happened to the goods, the burden of proof shifts back to
the bailor to show that the bailee’s negligence is responsible for the harm90
or that the bailee is guilty of conversion.91 Given that the bailor is almost
by definition removed from the chattel during the bailment, this shift is
significant.
C.

The Breadth of the Bailment Relationship

Bailment extends far beyond the archetypical case discussed above.
As Holt’s six categories suggest, bailment doctrine covers any
84. Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 816–17.
85. Helmholz, supra note 8, at 109–09; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 205 P.2d 1037, 1041
(Cal. 1949).
86. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 205 P.2d at 1041 (explaining the burden of proof); Silvers v. Silvers,
999 P.2d 786, 794 (Alaska 2000) (citing Lembaga Enters., Inc. v. Cace Trucking & Warehouse, Inc.,
727 A.2d 1026, 1029–30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 963
S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex. App. 1998); Temple v. McCaughen & Burr, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992); Sampson v. Birkeland, 211 N.E.2d 139, 140–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965); see also
Helmholz, supra note 8, at 103. But see Low v. Park Price Co., 503 P.2d 291, 294 (Idaho 1972)
(adopting the minority rule that places the burden of persuasion on the bailee).
87. See Johnson v. Hardwick, 441 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); see also U.C.C. § 7-403(a)
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“A bailee shall deliver the goods to a person entitled under
a document of title . . . unless and to the extent that the bailee establishes” one of the enumerated
excuses).
88. See Richard F. Broude, The Emerging Pattern of Field Warehouse Litigation: Liability for
Unexplained Losses and Nonexistent Goods, 47 NEB. L. REV. 3, 22–23 (1968) (explaining the
difficulty of allocating the burden of proof when neither party can explain what happened to the
goods).
89. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 255 N.Y.S.2d 788,
800 (App. Div. 1965), rev’d on other grounds, 213 N.E.2d 873 (N.Y. 1965) (“The total ignorance of
the bailees instead of being an excuse is the measure of their fault as warehousemen.”).
90. Helmholz, supra note 8, at 105–07. Holt, again borrowing from Bracton, labels these bailments
“commodatum.” Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 111; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 915 (KB).
91. LaPlace v. Briere, 962 A.2d 1139, 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
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relationship in which someone entrusts their property to another. This part
briefly traces the periphery of bailment doctrine to show the breadth of
the relationships and diversity of technologies that it covers. That
bailment doctrine has incorporated millennia of technological innovation
suggests that it is ready to incorporate internet-based innovations, and, but
for structural barriers to the modernization of the common law, may have
done so sooner.92
Gratuitous Loans to Friends. In this category, the bailor lends their
property to someone for free on the understanding that the friend will
return the good later.93 The person accepting the good is a bailee,
notwithstanding the lack of formal contract or payment between the
parties.94 Because only one party benefits in these transactions, some
courts have adjusted the obligations that the bailor and bailee owe each
other, holding that bailors have no duty to the bailees to inspect the goods
loaned and need not warrant their safety.95 Even here, however, the bailee
owes the bailor a duty of care to return the borrowed property. 96
Hired Goods. The same duty of care applies to the commercial
version of this relationship: hired goods.97 In this category, the bailee
receives use and enjoyment of the goods “without the burdens of
becoming and remaining the owner” while the lessor receives rent.98 The
classic cases involves renting out a horse to someone who then fails to

92. See infra section V.A.
93. Jurisdictions that have consolidated down to three or even two categories of bailment tend to
call these transactions gratuitous bailments. This category covers cases where there is no
“compensation in the ordinary sense.” Fili v. Matson Motors, Inc., 590 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (App. Div.
1992); see also Bailey v. Innovative Mgmt. & Inv., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 805, 809–10 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
94. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 8 (2021); Fili, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 963 (“The character or certainty
of compensation is not the distinguishing feature; the critical factor is whether some profit or benefit
was expected.”).
95. Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 296 N.W. 136, 140 (Minn. 1941) (“The gratuitous bailor is under
no duty to the bailee to communicate anything which he did not in fact know, whether he ought to
have known it or not.”); Bailey, 916 S.W.2d at 809 (gratuitous bailor liable for actual knowledge, not
constructive knowledge of defects in product).
96. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 111; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 915 (KB) (“[T]he borrower
is bound to the strictest care and diligence, to keep the goods, so as to restore them back again to the
lender, because the bailee has a benefit by the use of them, so as if the bailee be guilty of the least
neglect, he will be answerable . . . .”).
97. Holt and Bracton call these bailments “locatio et conductio,” referring to the lender as the
locator and the borrower as the conductor. Coggs, 92 Eng. Rep. at 109; 2 Ld. Raym. at 913; BRACTON,
supra note 29, at 284; see also Woodruff v. Painter, 24 A. 621, 622 (Pa. 1892) (finding a bailment to
be a bailment for hire “when no hire is paid in such cases only as it is a necessary incident of a business
in which the bailee makes a profit”); Inland Compress Co. v. Simmons, 159 P. 262, 263 (Okla. 1916)
(same); Tierstein v. Licht, 345 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (same).
98. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 776 (N.J. 1965).
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adequately care for the horse or rides it too hard.99 Today, the same is true
for rented cars and the like.100 More recently, dockless electric scooters
have reignited interest in the question of the obligations owed between
bailors and bailees in these relationships.101 Most modern courts hold
bailees who have rented property from their bailor to a negligence
standard.102
These bailments are distinct from bailments for hire because the
bailors warrant to bailees that the good is fit to use for the intended
purpose.103 They have a duty to inspect goods and will face standard tort
liability if they rent a dangerous product.104 Similarly, where the bailor
leaves the goods with the bailee to be repaired, the bailor must inform the
bailee of dangerous conditions not known to the bailee.105 In other words,
the obligations between bailors and bailees are mutual.
Pawn and Pledge. Moving into Holt’s fourth category, pawn and
pledge,106 the breadth of the bailment relationship becomes more
apparent. To pawn is to deliver goods to a bailee as collateral for a loan.107
Here, the bailor is the borrower and the bailee the lender. Pawnees are

99. BAKER, supra note 1, at 422.
100. Coffey v. Moore, 948 So. 2d 544, 545 (Ala. 2006) (determining that the party renting a car is
a bailee of the car).
101. See Darden Copeland, Comment, Electric Scooters: A New Frontier in Transportation and
Products Liability, 26 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2020); John Kendall, Comment, Could the Rise of
Dockless Scooters Change Contract Law?, 71 MERCER L. REV. 617 (2020).
102. See CFC Fabrication, Inc. v. Dunn Constr. Co., 917 F.2d 1385, 1388 (5th Cir. 1990).
103. Fili v. Matson Motors, 590 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963–64 (App. Div. 1992); Meester v. Roose, 144
N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1966); Cintrone, 212 A.2d at 777–78.
104. Butler v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 278 N.W. 37, 38 (Minn. 1938).
105. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 105 (2021); Se. Steel & Tank Maint. Co. v. Luttrell, 348 S.W.2d
905, 907 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).
106. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 109; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 913 (KB).
107. Pawn, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also STORY, supra note 1, at 196–97;
Jacobs v. Grossman, 141 N.E. 714, 715 (Ill. 1923) (“A pawn is a species of bailment which arises
when goods or chattels are delivered to another as a pawn for security to him on money borrowed of
him by the bailor.”); Johnson v. Smith, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.) 396, 398 (1850) (“A pledge or pawn is a
bailment of personal property, as security for some debt or engagement.”); Huddleston v. United
States, 415 U.S. 814, 819 (1974) (“[A] pawn transaction is only a temporary bailment of personal
property, with the pawnshop having merely a security interest in the pledged property, title or
ownership is constant in the pawnor . . . .”).
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liable to borrowers for negligence,108 although many pawnees attempt to
disclaim liability with mixed success.109
This category illustrates how the law of bailment allocates risk based
on information advantages. In choosing a pawnee, borrowers are entitled
to rely upon their perception of the pawn shop’s facilities. As one court
explained, pawning of an heirloom “imposed a personal trust upon
appellant to personally keep the property at his shop and under the
assurance of protection.”110 Transferring the property to another facility
opens the pawnee up to liability for conversion.111 Similarly, a pledge
agreement specifying that the goods be “stored in the Bay Warehouse, at
our risk and expense,” was only effective in adjusting the bailees duty of
care as long as the goods remained in the identified warehouse.112
This category, like consumer lending more generally, is rife with
misbehavior.113 Some pawnees attempt to circumvent consumer
protection laws by structuring the transaction as a sale with a right of
repurchase.114 But courts look through the parties’ terminology to the
substance of the transaction and find bailments where no true sale has
occurred.115 In these cases, the pawnee is responsible for the property,
notwithstanding assertions to the contrary.
Common Carriers and Tradespeople. Holt lumped those engaged in
“publick employment,” together with private citizens engaged in trade but
conceded that different rules applied to the two.116 Today, “publick
employment” largely aligns with common carries. At common law, these
common carriers included “innkeepers, victuallers, taverners, smiths,

108. See Stoljar, supra note 8, at 22 (explaining that courts held pledgees and depositaries to the
same standard of care); Jacobs, 141 N.E. at 715 (“All that is required by the common law on the part
of a pawnee in the protection of the property thus intrusted to him is ordinary care and diligence.”);
St. Losky v. Davidson, 6 Cal. 643, 647 (1856) (“A pledge is a bailment which is reciprocally
beneficial to both parties. The law therefore requires of the pledgee the exercise of ordinary diligence
in the care and custody of the goods pledged, and he is responsible for ordinary negligence.”);
McLemore v. La. State Bank, 91 U.S. 27, 29 (1875) (“[I]t was the duty of the bank to return the
pledge, or show a good reason why it could not be returned. This it has done by proof, that without
any fault on its part, and against its protest, the pledge was taken from it by superior force.”).
109. Dutherage v. Bos. Jewelry & Loan Co., 1989 Mass. App. Div. 144, 146–47 (Dist. Ct.).
110. Jacobs, 141 N.E. at 715.
111. Id.
112. St. Losky, 6 Cal. at 647.
113. See, e.g., Bullene v. Smith, 73 Mo. 151, 161 (1880) (lamenting that pawns are often used to
hide property from creditors).
114. Caudle v. City of Fayetteville, 866 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Ark. 1993).
115. See State v. Johnson, 799 P.2d 896, 897 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the defendant
could not avoid liability for trafficking stolen property by describing his sale as a pawn).
116. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112–13; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 917–18 (KB).
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farriers, tailors, carriers, ferrymen, sheriffs, and gaolers.”117 Common
carriers were liable for all harm to the bailed goods except those “acts of
God” and “enemies of the King.”118 Thus, the default rule was that
common carriers were strictly liable for the bailed goods, even in cases of
theft.
This rule is sometimes called “insurer’s liability” since the common
carrier is effectively insuring the goods from loss.119 Unlike insurers,
common carriers do not make individualized determinations about what
to charge their clients based on risk.120 Still, since their duty of care makes
them answerable for the good even where they may not otherwise be
answerable in tort, common carriers provide the economic equivalent of
insurance while the goods are in their possession.
Because common carrier liability is effectively a form of insurance, it
only applies where the bailee has exclusive control over the carried good.
In Stevens v. The White City,121 the Supreme Court held that towage
contracts did not create bailments because “[t]he tug does not have
exclusive control over the tow, but only so far as is necessary to enable
the tug and those in charge of her to fulfill the engagement.”122 Rather, the
towed vessel and its cargo remain under the control of the master and
crew, except “as is required to govern the movement of the flotilla.”123
According to Holt, the higher duty of care applied to common carriers
serves two purposes. First, it disincentivized collaboration with thieves.124
Second, it provides security to merchants and those who necessarily rely
on common carriers.125 Between the merchant and the common carrier,
one party has to bear the risk of loss for the bailed goods. The carrier is in
a better position to control that risk by taking precautions. Strict liability
is an imperfect rule, but a simple one. It avoids the need for fact-intensive
trials about the carriers’ negligence and the cause of the harm.

117. Beale, supra note 8, at 163.
118. Coggs, 92 Eng. Rep. at 112; 2 Ld. Raym. at 918.
119. See Beale, supra note 8, at 158 (arguing that common carriers’ liability “has nothing in
common with the voluntary obligation of the insurer” despite the name); see also Stoljar, supra note
8, at 31 (explaining that “the germs of the insurance-idea can already be detected” by the late
eighteenth century).
120. See Beale, supra note 8, at 158.
121. 285 U.S. 195 (1932).
122. Id. at 200.
123. Id.; see also The Steamer Webb, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 406, 414 (1871) (explaining the difference
between towage liability and common carrier liability).
124. Coggs, 92 Eng. Rep. at 112; Ld. Raym. at 918 (“[T]hese carriers might have an opportunity
of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with thieves . . . .”).
125. Id.
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Actions against common carriers often sound in negligence.126
Innkeepers and hotel operators are iconic defendants in these cases.
Historically, innkeepers were liable for the theft of guests’ property unless
the thief was one of the guests’ own servants.127 Today, many of the
bailment cases that reach an opinion involve cars parked at hotels.128
Hotels often attempt to disclaim the bailment, but, as in the case of
pawnees, courts look through these disclaimers to the facts of the
relationship.129
Today, the Carmack Amendment130 governs the liability of shippers
on bills of lading for loss of goods in their care. It provides that carriers
are liable “for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by (A) the
receiving carrier, (B) the delivering carrier, or (C) another carrier over
whose line or route the property is transported.”131 To make a claim under
the Carmack Amendment, “a shipper must prove ‘(1) delivery of goods to
the initial carrier in good condition, (2) damage of the goods before
delivery to their final destination, and (3) amount of the damages.’”132 The
burden then shifts to the shipper to show that it was “not negligent and the
damage was caused entirely by ‘[an] act of God[,] . . . the public
enemy[,] . . . the act of the shipper [itself,] . . . public authority[,] . . . or
the inherent vice or nature of the goods.’”133 Although this standard is not
quite the strict liability that Holt envisioned, it is close.134
Common carriers, like other bailees, can use contracts to limit their
damages. They can limit their liability for ordinary negligence but not
gross negligence.135 Similarly, courts regularly enforce damages caps
where shippers fail to note a higher value of the goods shipped on the bill

126. Beale, supra note 8, at 159 (recounting that the earliest recorded case of negligence against a
common carrier involves a boatman who was found to have overloaded the board causing the loss of
the plaintiff’s mare).
127. Southcote’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 1061; 4 Co. Rep. 83 b (KB).
128. Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286, 288–90 (Tenn. 1984).
129. Id.
130. 49 U.S.C. § 14706.
131. Id. § 14706(a)(1).
132. Paper Magic Grp., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 318 F.3d 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Beta Spawn, Inc. v. FFE Tranp. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2001)).
133. Id. (quoting Beta Spawn, 230 F.3d at 226); see also ABN Amro Verzekeringen BV v.
Geologistics Ams., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Under New York common law,
a common carrier is an insurer against damage to property received by it for transportation; the only
exceptions are losses arising from an act of God or from acts of the public enemy.”).
134. See, e.g., Paper Magic, 318 F.3d at 460–61 (holding a shipper liable for the full invoice
amount of a delivery of merchandise for Christmas 1998 that arrived at Target in early 1999 even
where the contract did not indicate that the goods were especially time sensitive).
135. ABN Amro, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 765–66.
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of lading.136 Critically, the shippers in these cases had the option to declare
a higher value, but opted not to, perhaps for strategic reasons.137 As the
New York Court of Appeals explained, these limitations on liability are
“supported by sound principles of fair dealing and freedom of
contracting.”138 Still, courts look more skeptically at common carrier’s use
of exculpatory clauses on the ground that common carrier liability has a
significant impact on the public interest.139 As the New Jersey Supreme
Court explained, “[t]he duty of the common carrier is sui generis. His
obligations are so peculiar, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to apply
closely, by way of analogy, the rules of law which control his conduct,
and give rise to his responsibilities, to the situation of other
contractors.”140
The unique rules that apply to common carriers do not apply to private
citizens who may be in possession of another’s property to work on it. For
example, cobblers repairing shoes in their shops are bailees and the
customers the bailors. They, like the bare naked bailees above, are liable
only for losses attributable to their own negligence.
Volunteers. Holt’s final category, and the subject of Coggs v.
Bernard, covered cases where someone delivered or worked on the goods
of another without pay.141 In these cases, the bailor alone benefits from
the bailment. In Coggs, the defendant, Bernard, along with his servants,142
attempted to transport several hogsheads of brandy from one cellar to
another. In the move, “one of the casks was staved, and a great quantity
of brandy, viz. so many gallons . . . was spilt.”143 Although the plaintiff
sued Bernard as a common porter, Bernard averred that he had not been
paid, thereby changing the nature of the alleged bailment.144 Holt
136. Kershen, supra note 62, at 1632.
137. Id. at 1632–33.
138. Art Masters Assocs., v. United Parcel Serv., 567 N.E.2d 226, 228 (N.Y. 1990).
139. See Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 111 A.2d 425, 427 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955)
(“Thus, a common carrier may not exempt itself from liability to a passenger for hire, but may as to
a non-paying rider.”); Brown v. Bonesteele, 344 P.2d 928, 938 (Or. 1959) (“If a common carrier
enters into a special contract to carry the same type of goods as he is authorized to carry under his
permit, he does not thereby change his position as a common carrier.”); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 377 (1873) (“[W]hen a . . . carrier be a corporation created for the purpose
of the carrying trade, and the carriage of the articles is embraced within the scope of its chartered
powers, it is a common carrier, and a special contract about its responsibility does not devest it of the
character.”).
140. Kinney v. Cent. R.R Co., 32 N.J.L. 407, 409 (Sup. Ct. 1868).
141. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 109; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 913 (KB).
142. Because the servants were agents, Bernard was liable for their acts. Id. at 107; 2 Ld. Raym. at
909.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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explained that notwithstanding their lack of payment, volunteer bailors
owe their bailees a duty of care because of their position of trust,145 and
that trust alone was “a sufficient consideration” for imposing an obligation
on the volunteer.146 Holt explained that, “neglect is a deceipt to the
bailor . . . [the volunteer’s] pretence of care being the persuasion that
induced the plaintiff to trust him.”147 Writing separately, Gould noted that
payment was evidence of the trust bestowed upon the bailee,148 not the
source of the responsibility.149
More modern courts agree. Writing in 1809, Lord Kent explained that
volunteers were generally not answerable for nonfeasance, regardless of
any promise they made, but they are answerable for misfeasance once they
undertook an act.150 Looking to Kent, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
explained Coggs as resting not on some theory of contract “but upon the
common-law doctrine that one who undertakes to perform an act and
performs it negligently whereby damage results is liable for his
misfeasance.”151 More recently still, the Tenth Circuit has even leaned on
this rule to cut through facts making it difficult to categorize the
relationship between the plaintiff and an alleged bailee.152
But while courts sometimes emphasize which party benefits from the
bailment and whether money changed hands, the standard of care for
which volunteer bailees are answerable is the same as bailees for hire:
negligence. This category illustrates how stable the core of bailment is:
when one party assumes possession of another’s property, for any reason,
that party is liable if their negligent acts later harm the property.
II.

STORING DIGITAL PROPERTY

Having traced the law of bailment as it applies to tangible property,
we come to the question of digital property. This Part explains the basics
of cloud storage and the risks that come with it. Next, it explains that
electronic files should be understood as a form of property. Finally, this

145. Id. at 110; 2 Ld. Raym. at 913.
146. Id. at 114; 2 Ld. Raym. at 920.
147. Id. at 113; 2 Ld. Raym. at 919.
148. Id. at 107; 2 Ld. Raym. at 909.
149. Id.
150. Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
151. La Brasca v. Hinchman, 79 A. 885, 885 (N.J. 1911); see also Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane
Holding Co., 130 A.2d 833, 837 (N.J. 1957) (quoting La Brasca, 79 A. at 885).
152. George Bohannon Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 323 F.2d 755, 757 (10th Cir. 1963) (holding that one
who takes possession of another’s property in an emergency is liable if their negligent handling of the
property damages it).
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Part explains that storing digital property carries risks similar to bailments
of tangible property: loss of possession and loss of exclusion.
A.

The Basics of Cloud Storage

Cloud storage refers to warehousing digital files on servers managed
by a third party. Cloud computing is the foundation of cloud storage.
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, cloud
computing “is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction.”153 Cloud computing depends on cloud
infrastructure—the hardware and software that make the cloud work.154
There are as many variations of cloud infrastructure as there are cloud
storage companies.
Cloud storage is different from network or local storage in that the
files actually live in the care of the storage company. To be sure, network
and local storage might rely on externally produced infrastructure to store
files, but the user nominally controls that infrastructure on site. With cloud
storage, the files are accessible to the user, but the infrastructure that
manages them belongs to and is in the possession of the cloud storage
company.
For the purposes of this Article, there are a few essential details. The
first is that cloud storage users save files to online services that then host
these files. The user might be intentionally storing files for later use—for
example, there are drafts of this Article saved on to Microsoft’s OneDrive,
a back-up copy on iCloud, and fragments archived with Evernote and
Dropbox. Similarly, a firm with a dozen employees working in different
locations may run all aspects of its business—their website, documents,
human resources infrastructure, and more—with Amazon Web Services.
Cloud storage can include any kind of file, from those intentionally
created and saved to incidental metadata that individuals have no
knowledge of. For consumers, most of what they do on their smartphones
implicates cloud storage in some way, especially as apps save less data
locally. For companies, and even governments, the data that comprise
their business is increasingly saved on the cloud.155 Some of these storage
153. PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011).
154. Id. at 2 n.2.
155. Cloud Storage Market Size, Share & COVID-19 Impact Analysis, FORTUNE BUS. INSIGHTS,

D’Onfro (Do Not Delete)

120

3/25/2022 9:34 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:97

providers might rely on third-party services to provide physical hosting,
but that matters less than the consumer’s choice to deliver their data in
some kind of online locker. Consider the analogy to a bank safety deposit
box: the depositors care about which bank their box is at far more than
they care about which fabricator made the physical box.
The second detail to note is whether the storage company can access
the files under its care or whether those files are encrypted before the
storage company has access to them. Here, the relevant encryption is not
the security measures that prevent unauthorized access to the files, but
rather the security measures that prevent even the storage company from
reading the data on its servers. For example, Apple famously uses end-toend encryption in its messaging app, making it nearly impossible for
Apple to access users’ data, even at the behest of law enforcement.156
When data is not encrypted, the storage companies conceivably know
what they are hosting. While they may not scan the files they store in
practice,157 if they had reason to want to know, they could.
B.

Electronic Files as Digital Property

Having covered how cloud storage works, it is time to look at the
subject of cloud storage: electronic files.158 These files can be difficult to
describe. On the one hand, from a functional perspective many of them
are perfect substitutes for tangible goods. Compare a Rolodex card to a
contact saved in your phone. On the other hand, unlike the chattels they
https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/cloud-storage-market-102773
[https://perma.cc/34D88BTA].
156. Caitlin Dewey, Apple’s iMessage Encryption Foils Law Enforcement, Justice Department
Complains, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/
apples-imessage-encryption-foils-law-enforcement-justice-department-complains/2013/04/05/f4a6b
66e-9d68-11e2-a2db-efc5298a95e1_story.html [https://perma.cc/4VRD-UCTD].
157. Many of the largest cloud storage companies do not even scan the data they store for child
pornography and other contraband. See Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Child Abusers Run
Rampant as Tech Companies Look the Other Way, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/09/us/internet-child-sex-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/5KKM-XR6W]; Sebastian Klovig Skelton, Parents Accuse Amazon of Inaction in
Combatting Child Abuse Material Online, COMPUT. WKLY. (July 31, 2020, 1:47 PM),
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252487004/Parents-accuse-AWS-of-inaction-incombatting-child-abuse-material-online [https://perma.cc/JZ5H-LSEQ]; see also Sean Gallagher,
Updated: How Verizon Found Child Pornography in Its Cloud, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 5, 2013, 8:51
AM),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/03/how-verizon-found-a-childpornographer-in-its-cloud [https://perma.cc/44J3-K5V5] (recounting how Verizon, unlike other
companies, does scan files it stores for child pornography).
158. The ALI prefers to use the term “data” instead of “file” to refer to code and its “physical
manifestation on a particular medium,” but concedes that data has two meanings, the other referring
to the meaning of the code. PRINCIPLES FOR A DATA ECONOMY—DATA RIGHTS AND TRANSACTIONS
§ 3 cmt. a (NEIL COHEN & CHRISTIANE WENDEHORST, AM. L. INST. & EUR. L. INST. 2020).
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replace, they are mostly intangible. Yet they are not quite like other
intangibles—goodwill, shares, etc. For starters, although you cannot touch
files, they exist in space on whatever medium they are stored. They are
potentially affected by events in the physical world. If your photos from
the 2010s are still on SD cards in some dark corner of your house,159 and
you lose them, damage them, or they otherwise fall victim to the powers
that be, those photos are gone. The photo files are distinct from any
medium on which they are stored, yet completely dependent on that
medium while they are there.
Other intangibles have no such connection to the tangible world. The
patents covering that SD card and the copyright in the photos are entirely
immune to the happenings in the physical world. These intangibles cannot
be accidentally lost or destroyed. Similarly, most shareholders no longer
keep snazzy certificates for each share they own. And even if they do,
losing those certificates does not destroy the shares. Files, by contrast, are
subject to accidental loss and destruction.
An SD card storing photos presents two familiar forms of property.
The physical SD card is a chattel, subject to the state laws of chattel that
have been around for centuries. The photos may be protected by
copyright. Though not universally accepted as full-fledged property,160
copyright and other forms of intellectual property now receive property
protections both under the statutes creating them and from general
property doctrine.
The SD card also has a potential third kind of property: the files
themselves. The question here is whether a file is property distinct from
whatever chattel houses the file and whatever intellectual property rights
might layer on top of it. A definitive answer to the question of whether
digital files are property is beyond the scope of this Article. Still, showing
that files are things that can be subject of bailment is essential to this
Article’s core claim that cloud storage creates a bailment.
Joshua A.T. Fairfield has made the most persuasive argument that
digital property is property. He argues that “property rights are nothing
but information: information about who may do what with which resource
over which time period.”161 The resource is secondary to the rights in the

159. This is a bad idea.
160. See Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 29–35 (2005)
(cataloging the debate about whether copyright is property or policy); see also Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141,
145–53 (2011).
161. JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM
135 (2017) (emphasis in original).

D’Onfro (Do Not Delete)

122

3/25/2022 9:34 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:97

resource.162 Freed from the constraints of tangibility, this conception of
property rights easily encompasses digital property such as files163 and
suggests that “the rules for ordinary property ownership should apply to
digital . . . property.”164
But if you are not convinced that electronic files are “Property” in the
strongest sense of the word, the question remains whether files are at least
a kind of quasi-property subject to some property doctrines. The answer
here has to be yes. The file is a distinct thing over which a person or entity
has control. This control has the typical attributes of ownership: the right
to exclude, use, alienate, and even destroy.165 These rights are independent
of any intellectual property that might attach to the file.
Consider the example of a team of researchers who have an electronic
file that holds data downloaded from a governmental agency’s public
website. For various reasons, that team has no intellectual property rights
in that data. Nor can the team claim any rights arising from licensing that
data. Still, that team has in rem rights attached to the file itself. It can
exclude others from the file that contains a copy of the data, keeping it
behind a password or on inaccessible servers. Even if that file is difficult
to replicate, perhaps because it is unmanageably large or because the
website from which it came is no longer public, the team has no legal
obligation to share its file. When the file is no longer useful to it, the team
can sell its copy of the file or delete it, no matter how badly someone else
wants it. And if someone converts the file and locks the team out of it, it
can sue to get it back.166
In this example, there is no reason to expect that the researcher’s
interest in the file would turn on where she stored the file. The researcher’s
interest in and rights to the file is distinct from the chattel on which it is
encoded. Her interest in the file should not be diminished if she chooses
to store the file on the cloud where a cloud storage company owns the
tangible servers that host the file. To say otherwise would be to erect
pointless formalities across functionally identical technology.
162. Id.; see also Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII
69, 70 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that property cannot be tied to
things because “most property in a modern capitalist economy is intangible”).
163. FAIRFIELD, supra note 161, at 135.
164. Id. at 16.
165. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 41 (2004) (“Outside of legislatively recognized intellectual property rights, legal scholars have
noted how markets in intangible properties have been conjured into existence through the simple
expedient of declaring a saleable interest.”).
166. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (theft of the domain sex.com); see
also Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159,
187–88 (2010) (explaining conversion of intangible property).
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Interference with Digital Property Rights

This part explores the risks that come with storing digital property,
and shows that those risks are analogous to those that come with storing
traditional, tangible property.
1.

Loss of Possession

There are many ways to lose possession of a tangible object. There
are unintended events: bouts of forgetfulness, accidents, natural disasters,
and theft, to name a few. Most of these translate directly to storing digital
property. After all, digital property exists on servers that are as susceptible
to physical harm as any other object. Back-up protocol, particularly on the
cloud, might mitigate the risk of loss. But the risk will never be zero.167
Accidental losses in the digital space are unintentional deletions or
corruptions of data. While actions by either the firm or the consumer can
cause this kind of loss, this Article is interested only in the former. What
happens when the company that hosts the stored data accidentally renders
that data inaccessible or unusable? Is there any reason why the outcome
should differ from what would happen if a storage company lost or broke
a tangible object?
Theft looks somewhat different in the digital space. Unlike with
tangible property, theft of digital property typically does not deprive the
owner of possession. Instead, it usually deprives the owner of the right of
and power to exclude. Still, there are real threats to possession: Hacks that
deny owners’ possession in order to extort a ransom, so-called
ransomware attacks, are becoming more common.168 There is always the
risk that a disgruntled employee will sabotage a company by deleting files,
wherever they may be stored.169
167. For a fanciful depiction of what it takes to destroy well-duplicated digital property, see Mr.
Robot: Season 1 (USA Network television broadcast June 24 to Sept. 2, 2015).
168. See Danny Palmer, Ransomware: Huge Rise in Attacks This Year as Cyber Criminals Hunt
Bigger Pay Days, ZDNET (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-huge-rise-inattacks-this-year-as-cyber-criminals-hunt-bigger-pay-days/
[https://perma.cc/79HK-PEXV];
Shannon Bond, Vanessa Romo & Laurel Wamsley, U.S. Hospitals Targeted in Rising Wave of
Ransomware Attacks, Federal Agencies Say, NPR (Oct. 29, 2020, 10:55 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/29/928979988/u-s-hospitals-targeted-in-rising-wave-of-ransomwareattacks-federal-agencies-say [https://perma.cc/8KAD-SFFF].
169. See Alanna Petroff, Experts: Global Cyberattack Looks More like “Sabotage” than
Ransomware, CNN (June 30, 2017, 8:27 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/30/
technology/ransomware-cyber-attack-computer/index.html [https://perma.cc/EZ3C-E333]; David W.
Chen, Man Charged with Sabotage of Computers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/18/nyregion/man-charged-with-sabotage-of-computers.html
[https://perma.cc/A2P7-5S5X] (reporting how a former employee deleted critical files causing $10
million in lost sales).
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In the storage context, there is also the risk that the cloud storage
company will decide to wind up its business. Ideally, it will give those
storing property notice and an opportunity to retrieve their property. But
there will be mishaps—notice is imperfect or it may be impossible to
retrieve the property in the given window. This risk is the same in both
digital and traditional storage arrangements. Companies may invite users
to store data with them only to decide to exit the business at a later date.
For example, when Twitter decided to close its popular social network,
Vine, it notified Vine users that they needed to export their videos before
a certain date after which they would no longer be available.170 Tumblr
did the same when it decided to ban “adult” content after allowing it to
flourish there for years.171 While users of free social medial might
understand their creations to be more ephemeral than items placed in
physical storage, the potential destruction of value is equivalent,
particularly if there is no convenient place to which to move the content.172
Government action against storage companies can also threaten
possession. Consider the case of Kim Dotcom’s file storage company,
Megaupload. In its heyday, Megaupload allowed users to store and share
all kinds of files. The company did not police the content of its servers for
intellectual property infringement and other violations of the law (of
which there were many), which eventually led federal prosecutors to shut
the site down.173 When it seized the company, the government did not
create a viable process for users to retrieve data, even if that data violated
no laws.174 With its assets frozen, Megaupload could no longer pay its
hosting bills, leading to several tense weeks where user data was on the
verge of destruction.175 Eventually, at least one hosting company deleted
170. See Sarah Perez, Vine Is Shutting Down, so Don’t Forget to Export Your Videos Today,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 17, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://social.techcrunch.com/2017/01/17/vine-is-shuttingdown-today-so-dont-forget-to-export-your-videos/ [https://perma.cc/4XW9-U7EZ].
171. Help Center: Adult Content, TUMBLR, https://tumblr.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/
231885248-Adult-content (last visited Jan. 17, 2022); What Tumblr’s Ban on ‘Adult Content’ Actually
Did,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/tossedout/tumblr-ban-adult-content
[https://perma.cc/SZ25-X7ZX].
172. See Ann-Derrick Gaillot, Life After Vine, OUTLINE (Jan. 16, 2018, 11:59 AM),
https://theoutline.com/post/2941/vine-shutdown-one-year-later-christiana-gilles [https://perma.cc/
555R-NAXN] (tracing what happened to Vine’s content after Vine shut down).
173. David Kravets, Megaupload Case Has Far-Reaching Implications for Cloud-Data Ownership
Rights, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/11/megaupload-data-what-todo/ [https://perma.cc/L7S4-YRA6].
174. Id.
175. Ernesto Van der Sar, MegaUpload User Data Soon to Be Destroyed, TORRENT FREAK (Jan.
30,
2012),
https://torrentfreak.com/megaupload-user-data-soon-to-be-destroyed-120130/
[https://perma.cc/PL26-4FRG]; Zack Whittaker, Megaupload Data Safe for “at Least Two Weeks”,
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petabytes of user data176 and some of the hardware storing the data has
become inoperable in the ensuing years.177
While advocacy groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation
warned that the government’s actions were violating the property rights
of innocent users,178 the digital files stored on Megaupload never received
the same treatment as traditional property. Indeed, even compared to
moneys held by shuttered electronic gambling sites,179 Megaupload’s user
files received little protection. Absent clear rules for what should happen
to user property in these cases, consumers should duplicate their holdings
across different cloud storage companies and perhaps even stick to storage
companies that are potentially too big to fail.
A subsidiary question in the cloud storage space is what are the cloud
storage company’s rights to deny their clients access to their files? Put
differently, can cloud storage firms deny their clients the right to use their
stored files? Firms may lock clients out of their files for non-payment or
violations of the terms of service. Locking clients out is one way to deny
clients possession of their files. Here, the analogy to the storage of
physical property is again useful. Depending on the reason, companies
that store tangible goods may lock out the owner of the goods.
Looking at how the loss of possession works in the digital space
reveals just how analogous digital storage is to physical storage. That the
two forms of storage are so similar suggests that they should be governed
by similar rules.
2.

Loss of Exclusion

In digital storage, loss of exclusion is loss of privacy. That
wrongdoers—whether the storage companies or intruders—can copy or
read the files without taking them is a particularly acute risk in this space.
Unlike chattels, there is no limit to the number of copies of digital property
that may exist and no limit on the number of people who might read a

ZDNET (Jan. 30, 2012), https://www.zdnet.com/article/megaupload-data-safe-for-at-least-twoweeks/ [https://perma.cc/MQF3-63X4].
176. Steven Vaughan-Nichols, Kim Dotcom: Petabytes of Megaupload Users’ Data Has Been
Destroyed, ZDNET (June 19, 2013), https://www.zdnet.com/article/kim-dotcom-petabytes-ofmegaupload-users-data-has-been-destroyed/ [https://perma.cc/3SBE-UEBM].
177. Ernesto Van der Sar, Megaupload Hard Drives Are Unreadable, Hosting Company Warns,
TORRENT FREAK (May 18, 2016), https://torrentfreak.com/megaupload-hard-drives-are-unreadablehosting-company-warns-160518/ [https://perma.cc/LHX6-BLW9].
178. Kravets, supra note 173.
179. David Kravets, Deadline Looms for Online Gamblers to Petition for Seized Bankrolls, WIRED
(July 14, 2011, 5:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/07/online-gambling-bankrolls/
[https://perma.cc/3GT2-ADJC].
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document. Having copied or read the files, these wrongdoers can vitiate
the owners’ right to exclude by publishing the files or revealing the
information that they contain.180
Some losses of exclusion will be minorly embarrassing, perhaps
revealing little more than a failure to use robust encryption. But others
will be far more significant, depending on the information copied. Bailors
could lose trade secrets, face security threats, or have the most intimate
details of their lives exposed.181
III. CLOUD STORAGE AS BAILMENT
Property students might think of bailment as one of those crusty
doctrines that only professors can love. Its modern iterations, particularly
in the law of warehouses, might seem a world away from the law of
Silicon Valley. But this is wrong. For all of the newness of cloud storage,
it is still storage.
A.

Situating Cloud Storage in the Law of Bailment

The basic bailment is the delivery of a good to the possession of
another on the expectation that the recipient will return the good at some
later point. The building blocks of the transaction are what matter. To
determine whether cloud storage is a bailment, there needs to be a good
that is capable of being stored.182 The good must actually be delivered and
accepted into the possession of the alleged storage company. And finally,
the parties must understand that the storage company will return the good
to the deliverer at some later point.
The relevant goods for this analysis are digital files.183 One example
is the file containing the draft of this Article that I stored primarily on
Microsoft’s OneDrive with backup copies saved to iCloud and Dropbox.
Other examples include the file encoding the spreadsheet that I used to
collect data on cloud storage contracts and the file encoding the
photograph that I took of my cat commandeering my keyboard. It is easy
180. See generally Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1113
(2016) (explaining privacy as a kind of quasi-property giving owners a relational entitlement to
exclude).
181. See, e.g., Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Relational Turn for Data Protection?, 6 EUR.
DATA PROT. L. REV. 492, 493 (2020) (arguing that legal conceptions of privacy underestimate the
power of data).
182. See Dickerson, supra note 17, at 130–31.
183. The case law on whether software or other digital goods can be the subject of bailment is thin.
See Bizrocket.com, Inc. v. Interland, Inc., No. 04-60706-CIV, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47887, at *14
(S.D. Fla. May 23, 2005) (denying summary judgment on a negligent bailment claim where the
moving party owned a server on which the plaintiff stored its software).
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to imagine that a smartphone user with an office job might make
thousands of these files each week. A retailer might have voluminous
inventory records and even more voluminous security footage from its
stores. Gone are the days of keeping one’s contacts on a physical Rolodex.
Now, those little cards live in the cloud, accessible on any device through
digital address books and customer relationship software. Given their
close analogy to tangible property, these files are best understood as
digital property.184
That brings us to the question of whether digital property can be the
subject of bailments. To be sure, the common law doctrine of bailment
predates the possibility of digital property. But there is no analytical
reason for limiting the law of bailment to tangibles. In many cases, digital
files have replaced tangibles in form without changing their function. For
example, I no longer need to preserve binders of the articles found in this
Article’s footnotes. I preserve the same content in digital files that I store
on the cloud. That is, my digital property has relieved me of the need to
maintain tangible property. Where there is something close to a 1:1
substitution of tangible property for digital property, the arguments for
divorcing digital property from the rest of the private law are thin.
Still, there is uncertainty about whether bailment covers other-thantangible goods. Story argued that intangibles, despite having many
attributes of property, could not be pawned because they could not be
delivered.185 For certain, legislatures sometimes passed laws specifying
that certain intangibles could be pledged.186 Despite earlier uncertainty,
modern technology demonstrates that digital property is capable of being
delivered much in the same way as tangible property, albeit via digital
means. So, while one cannot mail a digital greeting card to a friend by
post, email can substitute for the post.
While email might demonstrate that it is possible to deliver digital
files, the more difficult question is whether saving a file to the cloud is
delivering the file to the cloud storage company. Again, finding analogs
in the tangible world is instructive. If I want to preserve my drafts of this
Article without cluttering my office, I can corral them into redwelds that
I then drop off in my basement or remote storage unit. Dropping boxes of
Redwelds in my basement raises no question of bailment because I have
not delivered the boxes to anyone else. But dropping the boxes in remote
storage does raise questions of bailment precisely because there is a
storage company that has received the property. For our purposes, the
184. See supra section II.B.
185. STORY, supra note 1, at 38–39.
186. First Nat’l Bank of Macon v. Charles Nelson & Co., 38 Ga. 391, 402 (1868).
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question is whether saving files to the cloud is more like putting them in
one’s own basement or more like putting them in remote storage.
The latter seems correct. When the creators of a file save it to the
cloud, they cede at least some control over the file much in the same way
that one cedes some control when using a storage company. The owners
of the file, like the lessors of a storage unit or safe deposit box, retain the
right to access their property and may have some control over how secure
the property is, but they do not control the infrastructure that makes the
storage possible. Decisions about the infrastructure lie with the cloud
storage company or the owner of the self-storage site. While the storage
company might grant clients some customization rights or might seek
input from clients in its decision-making, as the owner of the storage
infrastructure, it is responsible for the infrastructure.
The question of acceptance may turn on the facts of each cloud storage
provider. Where the provider makes the cloud storage space available
without interacting with the client or going through any meaningful
verification, the storage might be more analogous to an unsupervised,
ungated parking lot—which usually does not create a bailment
relationship187—than to the kind of service that does. On the other hand,
if the cloud storage provider is scanning the files for contraband and
touting its security, the best analogy might be to the attended parking lot—
which usually does create a bailment relationship.188 Some scanning
appears to be the norm. For example, Dropbox scans uploads for
copyright infringement, even though it claims not to “read” private
files.189 In other words, Dropbox can inspect the files it hosts to limit at
least some of its liability. This ability to inspect files suggests that cloud
storage firms accept these files when they permit them to be saved and to
remain on their servers.
B.

Possession and Control

After cloud storage companies accept files for storage, the next
question is whether they are in possession of the files. This analysis often
turns on questions about whether the storage companies know what
property it stores and whether it controls that property. Cloud storage
companies may not know the content or value of the files using their

187. See Rhodes v. Pioneer Parking Lot, Inc., 501 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1973).
188. See Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286, 288–90 (Tenn. 1984).
189. Greg Kumparak, How Dropbox Knows When You’re Sharing Copyrighted Stuff (Without
Actually Looking at Your Stuff), TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 30, 2014, 1:38 PM),
https://social.techcrunch.com/2014/03/30/how-dropbox-knows-when-youre-sharing-copyrightedstuff-without-actually-looking-at-your-stuff/ [https://perma.cc/GY3G-SJR6].

D’Onfro (Do Not Delete)

2022]

3/25/2022 9:34 PM

THE NEW BAILMENTS

129

infrastructure, but they are knowledgeable about the fact of the storage. In
this way, cloud storage companies are like the providers of safe deposit
boxes.
Safe deposit boxes are secure lockers held in a vault, often at a bank
but sometimes at a stand-alone safe deposit company. These lockers are
supposed to protect deposited property from theft, natural disasters,190 and
accidental loss. Depositors pay the company rent for the box. In return,
the company gives the depositor a key and maintains various protocols for
keeping the box secure. There is some variation in these protocols, but
they typically involve some element of dual control, meaning that both
the depositor’s key and the bank’s key is essential for opening the box.
State law typically specifies the limited circumstances in which the safe
deposit company can drill the box open, including non-payment of the
rent, court order, and other law enforcement activity. While many people
trust their most valuable goods to safe deposit boxes, there are ample
stories of them failing to keep goods safe.191
Safe deposit boxes would seem an obvious application of the law of
bailment, and many courts have held that they are.192 Still, upon closer
inspection, there are several paths that safe deposit companies use to
challenge any bailee liability that they may face. The first path is contract.
Customers seeking a safe deposit box typically sign rental agreements.
These contracts often disclaim the creation of a bailment.193 Today, safe
deposit companies can unilaterally change these contracts to add
disclaimers not in place when the depositor rented the box.194 Many courts
have found these disclaimers to be ineffective.195 For example, in
190. See Seitz v. Lemay Bank & Tr. Co., 959 S.W.2d 458, 464 (Mo. 1998) (upholding a verdict
against a bank that failed to protect its vault from the Great Flood of 1993).
191. Stacy Cowley, Safe Deposit Boxes Aren’t Safe, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/business/safe-deposit-box-theft.html [https://perma.cc/H3FJFGR2].
192. See, e.g., Seitz, 959 S.W.2d at 461 (“It is well settled that when a bank lets a safe deposit box
to a customer, a bailment relationship is created between the bank and the customer as to the property
deposited into the box.”); James v. Webb, 827 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (“A safe deposit
box and the valuables placed therein, be they jewelry, coin collections, or bearer bonds create a
situation analogous to a bailment, rather than a bank account.”); see also 1 BANKING LAW § 10.03
(2020) (“The relationship between a bank and its customer renting a safe deposit box is that of bailee
and bailor, the bailment being for hire or mutual benefit.”).
193. See, e.g., Ellenbogen v. PNC Bank, N.A., 1999 PA Super 131, ¶ 4 (safe deposit agreement
disclaimed creation of a bailment).
194. See Cowley, supra note 191. But see Martin, Lucas & Chioffi, LLP v. Bank of Am., N.A., 714
F. Supp. 2d 303, 310 (D. Conn. 2010) (declining to enforce an exculpatory clause that the bank could
not prove was in the original safe deposit agreement).
195. See Smith v. Peoples Bank of Elk Valley, No. 01A01-9111-CV-00421, 1992 LEXIS 477, at
*10–14 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 1992) (holding that operation of safe deposit boxes meets the Tunkl
factors for when exculpatory clauses are ineffective).
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Ellenbogen v. PNC Bank, North America,196 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court explained that a disclaimer of bailment did “not dissuade [the court]
that the essential relationship created under the contract was one of
bailment.”197 The court explained that it could not “uphold a total waiver
of the fundamental legal relationship created by the contract. Such a
waiver would swallow the bank’s duty whole.”198 Judicial consensus that
safe deposit companies cannot contract out of being bailees has not
prevented companies from attempting to do so.199
Still, operators of safety deposit boxes, usually banks, have argued
that they are not in possession of goods stored in safety deposit boxes.
One argument that most courts have rejected is that because the bank has
no knowledge of what is in the safety deposit box, it is not in possession.200
A similar argument claims that deposit companies are not bailees because
they are not in exclusive control of the bailment.201 Neither has gained
traction.202 As the court in Cussen v. Southern California Savings Bank203
explained, “the very manner of conducting this somewhat peculiar line of
business contemplates that the bailee shall not know the value of the thing

196. 1999 PA Super 131.
197. Id. at ¶ 34.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Saribekyan v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. B285607, 2020 LEXIS 25, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 3, 2020), as modified (Jan. 6, 2020) (explaining that Bank of America’s safe deposit box
contract attempted to repudiate “any relation of ‘bailor and bailee’”).
200. See Nat’l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 95 N.E. 973, 977 (Ill. 1911) (holding that “the fact that
the safety deposit company does not know, and that it is not expected it shall know, the character or
description of the property which is deposited in such safety deposit box or safe does not change” the
bailment relationship); see also Lockwood v. Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co., 50 N.Y.S. 974,
976 (App. Div. 1898) (rejecting the argument that safety deposit boxes cannot create bailments lest
“it be said that a warehouseman was not in possession of silks in boxes deposited with him as
warehouseman, because the boxes were nailed up, and he had no access to them”); Cussen v. S. Cal.
Sav. Bank, 65 P. 1099, 1100 (Cal. 1901) (“Indeed, the very manner of conducting this somewhat
peculiar line of business contemplates that the bailee shall not know the value of the thing
deposited.”); Dumlao v. Atl. Garage, Inc., 259 A.2d 360, 362 (D.C. 1969) (holding that a hotel garage
was not the bailee of goods left in a car trunk because “acceptance of such contents must be based
upon either express or imputed knowledge, such as where they are in plain view”). But see O’Malley
v. Putnam Safe Deposit Vaults, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 752, 758 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (“In
Massachusetts, the liability of a bailee is not imposed with respect to the contents of a box or other
container unless the alleged bailee has knowledge of such contents.”).
201. Seitz v. Lemay Bank & Tr. Co., 959 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. 1998) (rejecting the argument that
there was no bailment because there was no exclusive control); Martin, Lucas & Chioffi, LLP v. Bank
of Am., N.A., 714 F. Supp. 2d 303, 311 (D. Conn. 2010).
202. See Steinhauser v. Repko, 249 N.E.2d 567, 571–72 (Prob. Ct. Ohio 1969) (“The courts of
Ohio seem divided as to whether a safe deposit box rental is a bailment, or, as the lease in this case
itself provided, a landlord-tenant relationship.”).
203. 65 P. 1099.
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deposited.”204 Cloud storage seems no different. Still, the lack of exclusive
control is perhaps a reason to categorize cloud storage as a bare-naked
bailment rather than the more protective bailment to a common carrier.205
Few cases have produced as much disagreement as Bowdon v.
Pelleter,206 decided in 1315.207 The question before the court was whether
delivery of a locked chest created a bailment in the contents of the chest.208
There, William of Bowdon delivered a locked chest to a widow, Emma
Pelleter for safekeeping.209 The chest was later found in a field with its
lock broken and the contents missing.210 Bowdon sued Pelleter for
detinue, to which she responded that she had been robbed, losing her own
property along with the chest.211 Pelleter claimed that he neither gave her
the key nor informed her what was in the chest.212 Bowdon denied that the
chest was locked.213 The records do not record the jury’s ultimate verdict
in the case.214 Holmes and Coke believed that the Pelleter could not be
liable on these facts because Bowdon never trusted the contents of the
chest to her.215 Holt, writing in Coggs, found the chest to be irrelevant.216
Story found the bailment relevant if the concealment of the goods in the
chest was meant to induce the bailee to accept a bailment that she would
not otherwise accept.217
Because bailees’ duty of care creates insurance for the bailor against
certain losses, bailees need to know the risk they are assuming. They can
account for the risk either by charging a higher price for the bailment or
by refusing the bailment altogether. Common carriers have no such
luxury, but they have benefitted from several statutory interventions
protecting them from outsized insurance risk.218

204. Id. at 1110.
205. See Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195, 200 (1932); see also supra section I.C.
206. YB 8 Edw. 2, 275, Pasch, pl. 8 (1315) (Eng.), reprinted in 41 SELDEN SOCIETY 136 (1924).
207. Id. Joseph Beale has cataloged the documentary issues with transcripts of this case. See Beale,
supra note 8, at 160 n.4.
208. Bowdon, YB 8 Edw. 2.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 110; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 913–14 (KB).
217. STORY, supra note 1, at 54–55; see also Stoljar, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining the evidentiary
difficulty of reconstructing what was in the chest if indeed the bailee was liable).
218. See supra section I.C.
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While the facts of Bowdon are fanciful today, the economics of the
transaction mirror self-storage and no-knowledge cloud storage.219 In selfstorage leases, individuals rent designated spaces from a storage
company, fill the space with their goods, and put their own lock on the
space. The lock is important: it is the only way for the lessee to control
the space and mark it as their own.220 The storage company neither has
knowledge of what is in the storage space nor access to the space without
cutting the lock.221 While self-storage would likely create a bailment
relationship, most states have self-storage statutes that protect storage
companies from becoming bailees of their tenants.222 Still, out of an
abundance of caution, industry convention is to require tenants to provide
their own lock and avoid handling tenant property.223 It is far from clear
whether these precautions would avoid creating a bailment relationship
absent the statutory protection.
Although the basic facts of self-storage would likely create a bailment
at common law, many states have implemented a law that places the risk
of loss on the tenant alone.224 The Kansas statute has language common
to several states: “[u]nless the rental agreement specifically provides
otherwise . . . the exclusive care, custody and control of all personal
property stored in the leased self-service storage space remains vested in
the occupant.”225 This logic resembles that employed in Bowdon: because
the chattel-owner’s lock separates the would-be bailee from the goods, the
storage creates no bailment. Other states continue to recognize selfstorage units as “bailments for hire”226 and codify that the bailee storage
companies are liable for negligence unless the contract states otherwise.227
Today, standard form self-storage contracts almost always disclaim
liability for negligence.228 Under these contracts, courts regularly find that
tenants bear the risk of theft, even where the storage company is aware of
219. No-knowledge cloud storage uses encryption to prevent the storage company from reading the
files it holds at any point in the storage relationship. This is different from the services that companies
like Dropbox employ when they scan files for contraband before encrypting them.
220. Jones, supra note 49, at 1017.
221. To be clear, the storage company might have rules about what cannot be stored and may have
security cameras to promote safety, but this is insufficient information for the storage company to be
said to know what is in the space.
222. Jones, supra note 49, at 1019.
223. Id. at 1035.
224. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-818 (2021).
225. Id.
226. Gonzalez v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc., 795 A.2d 885, 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).
227. Id. (applying N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:7-204 to self-storage). The New Jersey law is identical
to the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 7-204 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2022).
228. Jones, supra note 49, at 1022.
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security problems.229 Putting the risk of loss on the tenant may
occasionally shock tenants but is mostly consistent with the common law
of bailments.230
The enforceability of these disclaimers distinguishes self-storage
from other bailments.231 For example, in Kane v. U-Haul International,
Inc.,232 the Third Circuit found that an exculpatory clause in the rental
contract prevented the tenant from recovering damages for the losses
caused by a leak that the bailee knew about but failed to warn the tenant
about.233 The court in Kane even explained that “failure to notify probably
constituted gross negligence,” but found the exculpatory clause effective
as a matter of New Jersey law since the conduct was not “wanton and
willful.”234 In other words, bailees cannot disclaim all liability, but courts
will let them contract for a very low duty of care. In Kane, the court noted
that a tenant who wanted additional protection could always purchase
insurance.235
With robust encryption, it is more difficult to argue that the cloud
storage company possesses the file. Depending on the kind of encryption
used, it may be practically impossible for cloud storage companies to
access the content of the files stored in their infrastructure. After all,
breaking the encryption is an order of magnitude more difficult than
drilling a safe deposit box or cutting the lock on a chest. The arguments
around Bowdon begin to look more applicable to cloud storage if the
storage company cannot assess the files and decide if the storage fee
overcomes the risk of taking on the storage.

229. See Lathers v. U-Haul Co. of La., 03-1466, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/11/04); 875 So. 2d 839,
842. Under U.C.C. article 7, bailees cannot disclaim liability for conversion for their own use. U.C.C.
§ 7-204(b).
230. Recall that even as early as Coggs, Holt imagined that liability for loss would lie with bailors
who left their property with unfit bailees. Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 110–11; 2 Ld.
Raym. 909, 913–15 (KB). Here, tenants are theoretically aware of the security situation in their
neighborhood and ought not leave irreplaceable property where thieves are common. Of course, there
is no guarantee that self-storage will be available in more secure neighborhoods. Similarly, courts
have found that storage companies are not liable for losses cause by other tenants’ misconduct. See
Jones, supra note 49, at 1026.
231. Some states also have statutes giving dry cleaners similar rights over property left for more
than 180 days. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.300(3) (2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.214 (2021); see
also Jones, supra note 49, at 1045 (“[S]elf-storage facility owners enjoy legal powers that do not
make sense from the perspective of property law.”).
232. 218 F. App’x 163 (3d Cir. 2007).
233. Id. at 167.
234. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 49, at 1033 (arguing that storage companies are liable only for
intentional bad faith that damages tenants’ property and breach of the storage contract).
235. 218 F. App’x at 167.
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Cloud storage also raises questions about who is in possession of the
files that may differentiate it from other kinds of storage. It is almost
definitional that cloud storage is available on demand. This means that the
person or company that owns the files may be manipulating them—
perhaps even in possession of them—on a local computer while the files
live on cloud infrastructure. On these facts, the storage company may be
in possession of the files but not strictly exclusive possession.
It is not clear that it matters if the bailor can choose when and how to
break exclusive possession. Consider a workplace parking garage: the
employee is in possession of the car while driving it to and from work and
perhaps even during the workday while retrieving items from the car. But
the garage operator may still be a bailee in possession of the car for the
remainder of the workday.236 Still, the doctrine is not settled on these
questions. Some courts have held that bailments only exist where the
bailee has “such full and complete possession of it as to exclude, for the
time of the bailment, the possession of the owner.”237 Where the owner
does not intend to relinquish control, there is no bailment.238 For example,
a store clerk handing a good to a potential customer for inspection does
not create a bailment.239 But cloud storage necessarily involves
relinquishing some control. After all, the cloud storage company controls
the infrastructure that facilitates the storage. The cloud storage
relationship is more than the ephemeral custody of the customer
inspecting goods, it is a change in where the goods live.
In sum, there is little distinction between cloud storage and warehouse
storage. The introduction of modern technology ensures that the storage
occurs through different means but the relationship between the storage
company and the client remains the same. Because the law of bailment
polices that relationship, not the means of storage, it should apply to cloud
storage.
C.

Cloud Storage and the Duty of Care

Having shown that cloud storage is analogous to the bailment of
tangibles, the next step is to consider storage companies’ duty of care and
the extent to which they may waive those duties. Here, the kind of

236. See Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286, 288–90 (Tenn. 1984)
(explaining the conditions under which garage operators can become the bailees of cars parked on
their premises).
237. Fletcher v. Ingram, 50 N.W. 424, 425 (Wis. 1879).
238. BROWN, supra note 78, § 10.4.
239. Id.
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bailment matters since the kind of bailment determines the bailee’s
obligations to the bailor.
Where the cloud storage company receives payment—whether in
dollars or data—from the users of its services, it is most analogous to a
bailment for hire or bailment for mutual benefit.240 In these cases, the
default rule would be that the bailee company owes its customers a duty
not to act negligently with respect to the stored data. This standard might
compel firms to maintain security protocol at least at industry norms and,
more importantly, respond more promptly to reported security flaws.241
Bailment will not be a panacea for the lax data privacy laws in the United
States, but more robust protection against data loss may in turn prevent
data exposure.
An aggressive application of the law of bailment may analogize
unauthorized exposure of data to the law of misdelivery.242 Historically,
bailees of all kinds were strictly liable when they delivered the bailed
property to the wrong person.243
With tangible goods, assigning blame in the case of misdelivery is
easy since only one party controls the delivery—the bailee. Indeed, that
the bailee alone controls delivery is often used to justify the strict liability
rule.244 With cloud storage, customer error often creates the breach or
misdelivery.245 A strict liability rule is more difficult to justify on these
facts unless it is reserved for data breaches in which there is no customer
error.246

240. See supra section I.B.
241. Present law provides little incentive for companies to respond promptly to data breaches. See
Edward J. McAndrew, The Hacked & the Hacker-for-Hire: Lessons from the Yahoo Data Breaches
(So Far), NAT’L L. REV. (May 11, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/hacked-hacker-hirelessons-yahoo-data-breaches-so-far [https://perma.cc/MQ43-9PYR] (describing how Yahoo allowed
hackers to exploit a security flaw for years). There are already significant questions about the security
of cloud storage. See Kim S. Nash, Tech Chiefs Press Cloud Suppliers for Consistency on Security
Data, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2020, 6:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-chiefs-press-cloudsuppliers-for-consistency-on-security-data-11589967000 [https://perma.cc/DG4J-EU9Q].
242. Juliet E. Moringiello, Warranting Data Security, 5 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 63, 82
n.166 (2010) (“One can certainly think of a data breach as a misdelivery of personal payment data.”).
243. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
244. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 815–16.
245. James Rundle, Human Error Often the Culprit in Cloud Data Breaches, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
27, 2019, 3:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/human-error-often-the-culprit-in-cloud-databreaches-11566898203 [https://perma.cc/DL33-SSN4].
246. See Ryan Vacca, Viewing Virtual Property Ownership Through the Lens of Innovation, 76
TENN. L. REV. 33, 51–53 (2008) (explaining how exculpatory clauses for lost property in virtual
environments might promote innovation).
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Depending on the jurisdiction, the cloud storage company may be able
to disclaim liability for negligent acts causing harm to customers’ files.247
This kind of exculpatory clause would alert clients to the possibility of
data loss. Giving consumers the option to buy insurance for an additional
fee may increase the likelihood that a court will enforce the exculpatory
clause.248 Some courts might require that the exculpatory clause is only
enforceable where it is in place at contract formation.249 Efforts to
disclaim liability for gross negligence and intentional acts are less likely
to be effective.
Although there is significant variability among modern precedents on
the enforceability of exculpatory clauses, there are a few themes. First,
exculpatory clauses are ineffective when the bailee has allegedly
converted the bailors’ property.250 Second, clauses excluding liability for
gross negligence and intentional malfeasance are often held unenforceable
on grounds of public policy.251 Third, clauses excluding liability for
negligence are disfavored, but enforceable as long as they clearly state
what they disclaim and are not otherwise unconscionable or contrary to
the public interest.252 There is enough room in the tests for enforceability
that it can be difficult to know ex ante which clauses courts will enforce.253
247. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
248. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1963) (explaining that
exculpatory clauses may affect the public interest where the beneficiary “makes no provision whereby
a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence”); see also
Kanovsky v. At Your Door Self Storage, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 578, 579 (Ct. App. 2019) (enforcing a
clause disclaiming liability for water damage in a self-storage contract where the contract offered
customers an insurance option that the customer declined).
249. Saribekyan v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. B285607, 2020 LEXIS 25, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3,
2020), as modified (Jan. 6, 2020).
250. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Higbee Co., 76 N.E.2d 404, 408–09 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947); see
also U.C.C. § 7-204(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2022) (“Damages may be limited by a term
in the warehouse receipt or storage agreement limiting the amount of liability in case of loss or damage
beyond which the warehouse is not liable. Such a limitation is not effective with respect to the
warehouse’s liability for conversion to its own use.”).
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981). But see Jason R.
Harris, Sources of Marina Liability for Storage and Repairs Ashore and the Effectiveness of Red
Letter Clauses, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 545, 551–58 (2006) (tracing a split among courts about whether
maritime law allows exculpatory clauses to include all liability).
252. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that exculpatory clauses are enforceable
if the party signing the release is knowledgeable about the liability being released, that party benefits
from the transaction, and the contract is fairly entered into. Jordan v. Diamond Equip. & Supply Co.,
207 S.W.3d 525, 530 (Ark. 2005); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 815; Martins et al., supra
note 15, at 1286–90.
253. See Vacca, supra note 246, at 51–52 (explaining how uncertainty about the enforceability of
exculpatory clauses shapes tech innovation); James F. Hogg, Consumer Beware: The Varied
Application of Unconscionability Doctrine to Exculpation and Indemnification Clauses in Michigan,
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Courts have particularly struggled to determine when efforts to lower
bailees’ duty of care are contrary to the public interest. In the leading case
on the subject, Tunkl v. Regents of University of California,254 the
California Supreme Court summarized the challenge as follows: “The
social forces that have led to such characterization are volatile and
dynamic. No definition of the concept of public interest can be contained
within the four corners of a formula.”255 Still, the court articulated a sixfactor test for determining whether transactions affect the public interest:
It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for
public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in
performing a service of great importance to the public, which is
often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the
public. The party holds [it]self out as willing to perform this
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for
any member coming within certain established standards. As a
result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting
of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of
the public who seeks [its] services. In exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a
standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable
fees and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a result
of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is
placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of
carelessness by the seller or [their] agents.256
Hailed as the “true rule” of exculpatory clauses, Tunkl seemed to suggest
that enforceability was at the discretion of the court.257 Predictably, this
test has produced convoluted results when courts review exculpatory
clauses in bailments contracts.258
The extent to which exculpatory clauses are disfavored depends, in
part, on the kind of bailee. So-called “professional bailees” have the most
difficulty enforcing exculpatory clauses. For example, in Griffin v.
Minnesota, and Washington, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1011 (2006) (exploring how three states take
three different approaches to exculpatory clauses, leading to different substantive outcomes in cases).
254. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
255. Id. at 444.
256. Id. at 445–46 (footnotes omitted).
257. Daniel I. Reith, Comment, Contractual Exculpation from Tort Liability in California—The
“True Rule” Steps Forward, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 350, 351 (1964); see also Martins et al., supra note
15, at 1286–90 (explaining the legacy of Tunkl).
258. A. Darby Dickerson produced a comprehensive overview of the law as of 1988 in her Note.
Dickerson, supra note 17, at 132–34. The case law since then has added little certainty.
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Nationwide Moving & Storage Co.,259 the Connecticut Supreme Court
explained that “[a]lthough . . . limitation of liability clauses for
negligence may be validly contracted for by an ordinary bailee, [courts]
have demonstrated a strong tendency to hold contracts of this type against
public policy when entered into by bailees in the course of dealing with
the general public.”260 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Washington has
held repeatedly that “professional bailees may not limit their liability for
negligence.”261 Courts look to public policy to justify these limitations on
the freedom of contract. Hence, in Ellerman v. Atlanta American Motor
Hotel Corp.,262 a case involving a car that disappeared from a hotel
parking lot, the Court of Appeals of Georgia explained that the reason that
“[u]nlike an ‘ordinary’ bailee the ‘professional’ bailee is often precluded
from limiting by contract liability for [their] own negligence” is that “the
public, in dealing with innkeepers, lacks a practical equality of bargaining
power and may be coerced to accede to the contractual conditions sought
by the innkeeper or else be denied the needed services.”263 In many cases,
state legislatures have intervened with statutes limiting bailees’ risk
notwithstanding courts’ reluctance to do so.264
Beyond professional bailees and misdelivery, several courts have
indicated that they will not enforce exculpatory clauses that attempt to
avoid the bailment relationship altogether. For example, a court may hold
a bailee to a duty of care even where the underlying agreement purports
to create a license with no duty of care.265 Similarly, courts have refused
to enforce caps on bailee liability that effectively eliminate the duty of
care.266
Recent commentators have argued that exculpatory clauses are
allowing contracts to displace guardrails established by tort and other
private law doctrines.267 While bailment has often been an exception to
259. 446 A.2d 799 (Conn. 1982).
260. Id. at 804.
261. Am. Nursery Prods., Inc. v. Indian Wells Orchards, 115 Wash. 2d 217, 231, 797 P.2d 477,
485 (1990).
262. 191 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
263. Id. at 296.
264. See supra section I.A.
265. See, e.g., Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286, 288–90 (Tenn. 1984)
(explaining that the defendant parking garage could not use language printed on the back of a ticket
to transform a bailment into a license to avoid liability for harm to the car).
266. See, e.g., Allright, Inc. v. Elledge, 508 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (rejecting a
$100 liability cap in a parking contract as void against public policy); see also Dickerson, supra note
17, at 139–42 (explaining courts’ reluctance to enforce exculpatory clauses in bailment agreements
where the parties have unequal information and bargaining power).
267. See Martins et al., supra note 15; Fairfield, supra note 19.
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this trend, the rise of digital property creates a new opening for allowing
contracts to replace the traditional private law constraints on contract.
Courts should not let this happen.
In recent decades, software has evolved away from being a product
that customers purchase and own into being a service to which customers
subscribe. This shift “focuses on separating the possession and ownership
of software from its use.”268 This focus on use puts contracts at the center
of the law of technology. For consumers, these contracts are classic
adhesion contracts: tech firms set the terms then consumers either accept
the terms or walk away. Larger firms may have the bargaining power to
customize their technology contracts, but given the relative scale of
companies like Amazon and Microsoft, that is not a given.269 Either way,
the elevation of the service contract tends to center consent at the expense
of the procedural and substantive guardrails that other private law
doctrines have historically provided. That is, focusing on the service
contract alone limits the analytical tools through which we might
understand the technology.
Even in jurisdictions that allow bailees to disclaim liability for
negligence, there is no guarantee that courts will enforce such a clause in
a cloud storage contract. Courts may find such a clause to be
unconscionable or against the public interest according to the factors in
Tunkl.270 In a dispute over lost data, both the cloud storage company and
the upset client would have strong arguments on their side.
The client would argue that there is asymmetric information about the
risk of either loss of possession or loss of privacy. Most cloud storage
clients cannot vet the security of the system. It is unobservable in a way
that the security around self-storage or a safe deposit box is not. Indeed,
merely allowing clients to vet the security of cloud storage infrastructure
would likely create risk for other users. For these reasons, allowing the
bailee to use contracts to lower their duty of care or cap their liability may
create significant moral hazard.271 With enforceable waivers, the bailee
would face only limited incentives to act carefully from ex ante market
forces, and similarly limited incentives from ex post liability rule.
For their part, cloud storage providers can argue that their exculpatory
clause poses no grave risk to the public interest because there is a
competitive market offering several options. Moreover, most digital files
268. Mark Turner, David Budgen & Pearl Brereton, Turning Software into a Service, 36
COMPUTER 38, 38 (2003) (emphasis in original).
269. But see OVERLY & KALYVAS, supra note 15 (explaining that even for businesses there is often
little room to negotiate the terms of technology contracts).
270. See supra notes 254–256 and accompanying text.
271. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 8, at 815 (explaining information asymmetries in bailments).
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can be copied infinitely, enabling clients to efficiently insure their own
data. Finally, the industry standard may coalesce around broad
disclaimers for lost data, such that consumers should expect to maintain
duplicates of their data. Clauses that require customers to maintain a
backup of their data may nudge courts towards enforcing exculpatory
clauses. If marginal increases in security on any one cloud are
comparatively expensive, it is possible that this duplication norm is
efficient.
Differentiation within the industry on the level of security provided
may suggest that enforcing some exculpatory clauses is in the public
interest, assuming that firms price their products accordingly. Individuals
and firms that need additional protection for their digital property might
choose a service offering better protection. This differentiation already
exists in the market for storage of tangible chattels; just compare selfstorage to a bank safe deposit box. The law can trust consumers to choose
among cloud storage providers just as it trusts consumers to choose
between safe deposit boxes and self-storage. Alternatively, clients can
contract with the cloud storage provider for a higher standard of care,
much like a person can deliver a chattel to a bailee “for safekeeping.” The
ability to contract for a higher duty of care is as old as the law of bailment
itself.272 Presumably, cloud storage companies would charge a premium
for taking on such risk.
These same arguments support allowing cloud storage providers to
cap their liability based on the fee charged. These arguments are
especially strong where the companies have no knowledge of the value of
the data their clients store with them. Such a cap would be consistent with
many of the statutory interventions in self-storage and U.C.C. article 7.273
While safe deposit companies have not been able to avoid liability as
bailees for hire, they have attempted to cap their liability by contract. For
example, in an unpublished decision in Saribekyan v. Bank of America,
N.A.,274 the bank allegedly lost millions of dollars of its client’s valuables
when it drilled her box in connection with closing the branch.275 The safe
deposit rental contract purported to limit damages to ten times the annual
rent on the box.276 Bank of America argued that this provision was
necessary because it had no knowledge of the content of the boxes.277 The

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See supra section I.A.
U.C.C. § 7-204 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2022).
No. B285607, 2020 LEXIS 25 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2020), as modified (Jan. 6, 2020).
Id. at *8–10, *12.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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trial court enforced the liability cap, but the Court of Appeal reversed,
explaining that “[i]f this is a confidential, but not safe or secure, box, then
it needs to expressly disclose that fact and to disclaim in a much more
obvious fashion that it is renting a deposit box that may ultimately prove
to be insecure.”278 The court concluded that the limit was unconscionable
given the disconnect between the service that the bank purported to
provide and the service specifically described in the contract.279 Whether
other courts follow Saribekyan remains to be seen.
Where the cloud storage company offers its services for free,
particularly if it is not monetizing customer data, the cloud storage
company may be more analogous to Holt’s volunteer or gratuitous bailee
than to a bailment for hire. Still, having made themselves available as a
bailee, the volunteer owes the bailor a minimal duty of care.280
Recognizing cloud storage as a bailment does impose a duty of care
on cloud storage providers, but it also offers protection from liability. A
cloud storage company facing lawsuits from losses attributable to hacking
may find refuge in the long line of cases holding that bailees are not liable
for losses attributable to theft provided that they exercise reasonable care
in preventing the theft.281 Somewhat more fancifully, if the hack comes
from abroad, they may find an especially effective shield in the old enemy
of the king defense,282 which protected bailees from liability when said
enemies injured or destroyed the stored property. Though born in a world
of feuding states, the defense remains vibrant in admiralty given the
persistent threat of online piracy.283
278. Id. at *29–30.
279. Id.
280. See Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84, 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (explaining that once a volunteer
undertakes a bailment, he owes the bailor a duty of care).
281. See supra section I.A.
282. Some of the most curious rules of bailment impose liability on those charged with detaining
others, usually pursuant to the criminal law. Sheriffs and gaolers were kinds of public employment
that traditionally carried a higher standard of care. Wardens were historically thought to be bailees
with the prisoners themselves being the bailment. See Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss 575, 584 (1875)
(explaining that a “sheriff is not a mere bailee” of the prisoner, but in fact owes a higher duty of care).
Courts imposed a particularly high duty of care on wardens, holding them responsible for prisoners’
escape even if “traitors or rebels” assisted in the escape. Only acts of God or enemies of the king
would discharge wardens from their liability. See Beale, supra note 8, at 163, 167; see also
Southcote’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1063; 4 Co. Rep. 83 b (“[I]f the enemies of the king
break a prison and let the prisoners at large, the warden of the prison may discharge himself for the
escape; but if the prison be broken by traitors or rebels it is otherwise, because he has a remedy over
against them, and it was his fault that he did not guard them more carefully.”); Coggs v. Bernard
(1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112; 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918 (KB) (“The law charges this person thus intrusted
to carry goods, against all events but acts of God, and of the enemies of the King.”).
283. King Ocean Cent. Am., S.A. v. Precision Cutting Servs., Inc., 717 So. 2d 507, 511–12 (Fla.
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In sum, because bailees’ duty of care arises out of their relationship
with their bailors, regardless of contract, it is far from clear that contract
alone can undo that duty. Were these bailments of tangible goods, there
would be ample case law holding that parties cannot disclaim the bailment
relationship. Cloud storage is sufficiently analogous to traditional storage
that this case law should apply. That is, we should not allow the novelty
of the technology to overshadow the legal frameworks that we have for
analyzing these relationships.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CLOUD STORAGE CONTRACTS
Having outlined the basics of bailment doctrine and the mechanics of
cloud storage, it is time to ask how cloud storage companies understand
their storage obligations. To study this question, I pulled a sample of fiftyeight contracts used by fifty-four cloud storage companies and reviewed
their terms.284 This Part describes the sample, its limitations, and findings.
This study does not purport to be comprehensive. Rather, its goal is to
provide a snapshot as of 2020 of the terms that cloud storage companies
offer to consumers and businesses unwilling or unable to negotiate custom
terms.285
A.

Methodology and Limitations

To build a sample of contracts from cloud storage providers, I needed
a workable definition of cloud storage company. Leaning on NIST’s
definition,286 I defined cloud storage companies as any company that
provides cloud-based data storage services to its customers as a core part
of its business. This definition is meant to exclude two types of related
businesses: those that primarily provide data management services for
companies that choose to keep their data on their own local network and
companies that only store incidental data in cloud-based systems. For
example, a network security business that stores its customer relationship

1998) (explaining the application of the enemies of the king defense to common carriers at sea); see
also Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Lippman, 36 S.E. 202, 206 (Ga. 1900) (railroads); Montgomery Ward &
Co., Inc. v. N. Pac. Terminal Co. of Or., 128 F. Supp. 475, 492 (D. Or. 1953) (railroads and trucking
lines).
284. The universe of contracts considered is available at: https://wustl.box.com/s/
qrwguwxk8p5j9jeuroige7lpv2g74wpu (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
285. Although 2020 was a highly unusual year given the global coronavirus pandemic and disputed
election in the United States, there is no reason to assume that those events would have caused
companies to make changes to their cloud storage contracts.
286. See MELL & GRANCE, supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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data in the cloud would not be on my initial list, nor would a dentist with
a digital address book.
To build this list I relied on media reports to develop a list of
companies providing cloud storage services. This list included both
consumer-facing companies, like Dropbox and Facebook,287 and
business-oriented companies, like Amazon Web Services (AWS). This
initial list included companies in a range of sizes, from mid-sized firms
like Wasabi, to giants like AWS and Google. This list was by no means
comprehensive. It almost certainly excludes cloud storage companies that
have attracted little media attention.
Having built an initial list of fifty-four companies with fifty-eight
cloud storage services,288 I searched these companies’ websites for the
contracts that they offered prospective customers. Of the cloud storage
products in the sample, I found the storage contracts for fifty-nine of them.
Firms typically styled these contracts as “terms of use” or “terms of
service.” Working with a team of research assistants, I downloaded these
contracts over the spring and summer of 2020. These contracts comprise
the sample.289 Having pulled the sample of contracts, I then read them and
recorded any terms relating to the companies’ liability for damaged, lost,
stolen, or accidentally released data.
This sample has several key limitations. First, as described above, it
is not drawn from any comprehensive list of cloud storage companies. It
is possible that the selection process has influenced the findings. Relying
on media reports also likely skews the sample towards consumer-facing
companies. Second, the sample does not include any contracts that firms
did not make publicly available on their website. While few companies
appeared to offer potential clients the opportunity to negotiate the terms
of their agreement, it is reasonable to assume that some clients, especially
large clients, can and do negotiate for nonstandard terms. These
customized contracts are not readily available on public websites, and
therefore are not in the sample. Finally, in many cases, it is impossible to
determine if a company is providing its own cloud infrastructure or
relying on another company, notably AWS. This means that I cannot
know if the contract between the cloud infrastructure provider and the
cloud storage company influences the terms that the cloud storage

287. Although Facebook is best known as a social media company, both Facebook and Instagram
enable users to store large numbers of photos and other media.
288. Three companies in this sample, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, offer multiple cloudstorage products with distinct contracts.
289. My team also attempted to use the WayBack machine to find older versions of these contracts,
but the coverage was too spotty to be useful.
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company makes publicly available. Despite these limitations, this sample
reveals what consumer-facing cloud storage contracts looked like in 2020.
B.

Results and Analysis

A manual review of the contracts in the sample revealed that fifty-two
had one or more terms attempting to limit liability for data loss. MSP
360’s disclaimer is typical: “We are not responsible for content residing
on the Website. In no event shall we be held liable for any loss of any
Content. It is your sole responsibility to maintain appropriate backup of
your Content . . . . We make no guarantee that the data you need will be
available.”290 Microsoft Azure’s terms specify that neither party will be
liable for “damages for lost profits, revenues, business interruption, or loss
of business information, even if the party knew they were possible or
reasonably foreseeable.”291 Consumer-facing products like Box, Dropbox,
Evernote, Flickr, and iCloud all contain similar terms.292 One of the most
aggressive disclaimers in the sample belongs to Dribbble, which caters to
designers.293 Where permissible, Dribbble has customers agree that
“under no legal theory” will it be liable for loss of data.294
Some companies include what Professor David Hoffman calls
“precatory fine print”—instructions dictating how consumers should use
the product or service.295 In this sample, precatory fine print often
specifies that customers should maintain at least one additional copy of
their data. For example, Rackspace’s contract provides that “[a]lthough
the service may be used as a backup service, Customer agrees that
Customer shall maintain at least one additional current copy of
Customer’s Customer Data somewhere other than on the Rackspace
Public Cloud Services.”296 HostMonster’s contract says, “[y]ou will be
solely responsible to for backing-up all Subscriber Content, including any
Subscriber Websites off of HostMonster’s servers. This is an affirmative
290. Terms and Conditions, MSP360 (formerly CLOUDBERRY LAB) (downloaded Apr. 30, 2020)
(on file with author).
291. Online Subscription Agreement, MICROSOFT AZURE (downloaded Apr. 30, 2020) (on file with
author).
292. Box Service Agreement, BOX (downloaded Apr. 28, 2020) (on file with author); Dropbox
Terms of Service, DROPBOX (downloaded Apr. 28, 2020) (on file with author); Terms of Service,
EVERNOTE (downloaded Apr. 28, 2020) (on file with author); Flickr Terms & Conditions of Use,
FLICKR (downloaded June 25, 2020) (on file with author); Use of Service, ICLOUD (downloaded Apr.
29, 2020) (on file with author).
293. Terms of Service, DRIBBBLE (downloaded June 25, 2020) (on file with author).
294. Id.
295. David A. Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (2018).
296. Rackspace Public Cloud Product Terms, RACKSPACE (downloaded Apr. 30, 2020) (on file
with author).
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duty.”297 Photobucket uses similar terms.298 These terms put customers in
a bind: to lose one’s data is to be in breach of contract.
Only one contract used the term “bailment” at the time of this study.
BackupVault’s contract provides that “[n]o bailment or similar obligation
is created between the Subscriber and [BackupVault] with respect to the
Subscriber’s stored encrypted data.”299 Amazon Web Services’ contract
explicitly disclaimed “any duties of a bailee or warehouseman” in 2017,300
but that language was not in the contract available on its website at the
time of this study.301 Without a bigger pool of historical contracts, it is
impossible to know if bailment was commonly contemplated at an earlier
time.
Beyond limiting their liability for lost data, thirty-eight contracts in
the sample explicitly reserve the right to delete customer data. Some
specify that they will provide notice before deleting data.302 Others tie this
right to delete to non-payment or violation of the terms of use, but most
of these clauses leave the company with broad discretion over when to
delete customer data.303
V.

COMPLICATIONS & IMPLICATIONS

If digital asset storage so clearly looks like a bailment and cloud
storage firms have the same liability concerns as traditional bailees, it is
fair to ask why there is no line of cases on the topic and if the classification
of digital asset storage as a bailment matters at all. This Part turns first to
the question of why these cases have not come before state courts and then
to the question of why the categorization matters. On the latter question,
this Part first argues that the categorization has significant implications
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and second that it matters for the
future of ownership more broadly.

297. User Agreement, HOSTMONSTER (downloaded June 25, 2020) (on file with author).
298. Photobucket.com Terms of Use, PHOTOBUCKET (downloaded June 25, 2020) (on file with
author).
299. Terms and Conditions, BACKUPVAULT (downloaded Apr. 30, 2020) (on file with author).
300. AWS Service Terms, AMAZON WEB SERVICES (last updated Oct. 16, 2017) (on file with
author).
301. AWS Service Terms, AMAZON WEB SERVICES (downloaded Apr. 28, 2020) (on file with
author).
302. See, e.g., Box Service Agreement, supra note 292 (giving users thirty days to preserve their
data if and when the service agreement between Box and the customer is terminated); Dropbox Terms
of Service, supra note 292 (allowing terminated customers a “commercially reasonable” period before
deleting their data).
303. Online Subscription Agreement, supra note 291; User Agreement, supra note 297.
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The Missing Common Law

Since the Middle Ages, common law courts have been the institution
charged with promulgating the law of bailment and adjusting it to
accommodate emerging forms of property and new technologies. While
the common law process is imperfect, it guaranteed that the law was
constantly subject to revision. Any case presenting new technology would
challenge the court to fit that technology into existing law.
Over the past century, the common law has been left to wither. Its
replacements—codification, arbitration, and to a lesser extent, federal
diversity jurisdiction304—are hardly as robust. For over a century,
commentators have hotly debated the merits of the common law as
compared to codification.305 As state legislatures have codified the law of
bailment, they have potentially prevented it from evolving to
accommodate new technologies such as cloud storage.306 For example, if
a state has a bailment statute that covers only tangible goods, a judge
hearing a case about digital property must decide whether the statute is
inapplicable to digital property or the statute prohibits bailments of digital
property. The latter position is arguably more deferential to the legislature.
It may be especially appealing when suspicion of judicial overreach runs
high. To be sure, legislatures can and do periodically update the law, but
that process is tied less to the needs of any one case and more to the
political economy.
The shift away from traditional common law judging suggests that
only a statute will firmly locate cloud storage in the law of bailment. One
solution is to codify the duty of care that cloud storage providers owe their
clients. This approach has the benefit of directly tackling the problem at
hand, but it risks inserting rigid code into a rapidly evolving space.
The second force limiting the common law’s adaptation to new
technology is arbitration.307 Digital storage is always a creature of
contract—the terms of service. Cloud storage companies often include

304. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common
Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 600 (2020) (finding that contracts involving newer technologies lack
adjudication by courts of apex jurisdiction).
305. See generally Aniceto Masferrer, The Passionate Discussion Among Common Lawyers About
Postbellum American Codification: An Approach to Its Legal Argumentation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173
(2008) (tracing the history of the debate between codification and the common law).
306. See Aniceto Masferrer, Defense of the Common Law Against Postbellum American
Codification: Reasonable and Fallacious Argumentation, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 388 (2008)
(explaining that a common argument against codification was that codes were rigid).
307. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 125–26, 130–32 (2012) (explaining how arbitration pushes the resolution of publiclyimposed obligations into private tribunals).
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arbitration provisions in these terms,308 meaning that if one did lose
customers’ data, it is unlikely that there would ever be a precedential court
opinion explaining whether, and if so, how, cloud storage companies act
as bailors for their customers.309
Given the value of the data stored on the cloud, the uncertainty around
the applicable law is remarkable. We might attribute some of that
uncertainty to the lack of significant losses of data stored in the cloud, but
that alone does not justify the uncertainty. After all, courts developed the
law of bailment over a myriad of small cases—individual coats, horses,
and other small chattels.310 From Megaupload to Tumblr and beyond,
these kinds of small losses have already occurred.311 What is more, it is
not clear how the law of cloud storage can become more certain. Not only
are there few cases in state courts over which to develop precedent, but
given piecemeal codification, it is unclear that courts will believe
themselves to be institutions competent to promulgate rules.
Absent any law of bailment that contemplates cloud storage, the law
of contract will be its alpha and omega. While contracts have the benefit
of private ordering, or at least the fiction thereof, they are potentially
inefficient. The law of bailment has always been a system of default rules
that spare parties inefficient negotiations for routine transactions.
Eliminate those defaults and the parties must negotiate even small deals,
or the less powerful party must accept the terms on offer. That is, cloud
storage could become another topic of contract-as-product.312
Finally, even if the question of whether cloud storage creates a
bailment was before a court, it would likely be a federal court sitting in
diversity jurisdiction. Cloud storage is, almost by definition, accessible
anywhere meaning that the clients who could experience data loss are
likely to be diverse to the cloud storage company. Such a court would look
308. See David Horton, Infinite Arbitration Clauses, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 657–60 (2020)
(arguing that companies have been expanding the scope of their arbitration clauses beyond the
agreements that contain the arbitration provision); Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC, 971 F.3d 284, 287, 293–
95 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that companies may compel arbitration even where the relevant arbitration
provision is only in a contract between the consumer and an affiliated company).
309. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J.
3052, 3076–81 (2015) (explaining how arbitration thwarts the public evolution of the law).
310. See supra Part I.
311. See supra section II.C.1.
312. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003) (“Terms that govern the contractual
relationship between buyers and sellers are attributes of the product in question, just as are the
product’s price and its physical and functional characteristics.”); Margaret Jane Radin, Comment,
Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1230
(2006) (“The collapse of contract into product has conceptually been in the offing for a long time; but
it has really come to fruition now that both terms and products are digitized.”).
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to the state common law but might feel less empowered to push the
boundaries of that law. And even if it did, its opinion would not become
the new common law of the applicable state but would stand on its own
as law outside the law.313
B.

The Fourth Amendment

Recognizing that cloud storage creates a bailment relationship may
shape the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.314 In Carpenter v.
United States,315 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
protects cell phone location information held by cell phone service
providers.316 Carpenter appeared to endorse the idea that some
technological innovations are the “modern-day equivalents” of searches
subject to the Fourth Amendment.317
Carpenter is a departure away from a privacy-based theory of the
Fourth Amendment towards a positive law approach.318 Concurring in
Katz v. United States,319 Justice Harlan explained that searches trigger the
Fourth Amendment when they implicate an “expectation of privacy” that
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”320 Over time, the Court
recognized the third-party doctrine as an exception to the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. The third-party doctrine provided that
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy to information
provided to third parties.321 Carpenter appears to scale back the third313. Issacharoff & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 304, at 607–08.
314. See generally Eric Johnson, Note, Lost in the Cloud: Cloud Storage, Privacy, and Suggestions
for Protecting Users’ Data, 69 STAN. L. REV. 867, 885–95 (2017) (exploring the privacy implications
of cloud storage); Aaron J. Gold, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth Amendment and Searching Cloud
Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2321, 2324–25
(2015) (examining the Fourth Amendment implications of cloud storage); Laurie Buchan Serafino,
“I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The Fourth Amendment, Riley’s Impact,
and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 162–63 (2014)
(same); David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to
Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205 (2009) (same); Lucas
Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 987,
995 (2016) (contemplating the intersection of cloud storage and the third-party doctrine).
315. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
316. Id. at 2223.
317. Id. at 2222 (praising Justice Kennedy’s “modern-day equivalent[]” test); see also Paul Ohm,
The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 357, 360 (2019).
318. Daniel Epps, Justifying the Fourth Amendment (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
319. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
320. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
321. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (use of a pin register to log phone calls
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party doctrine; after all, the cell phone location data at issue in the case
was held not by the target of the search, but by that individual’s cell phone
service provider.322 In doing so, the Justices looked to other areas of law
for a place to anchor search doctrine.
For the purposes of this Article, the relevant question is how these
tests interact with cloud storage. On the one hand, many cloud storage
customers take great care and expense to preserve the privacy of the
information that they store in the cloud. On the other hand, the cloud
storage provider would seem to be the classic third party, especially where
the cloud storage can and does read its clients’ files for its own purposes.
The problem of how technological innovations interact with the
Fourth Amendment is not new.323 In Kyllo v. United States,324 which held
that police need a warrant to scan a home with a thermal imaging device,
the court grappled with the question of “what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”325
Fourth Amendment scholarship is rich with theories about how to
square the amendment’s protections with technological innovations.326
Prior to Carpenter, a few leading theories looked to property, among other
sources, for a more meaningful anchor than a “reasonable” “expectation
of privacy.” Notably, Will Baude and James Stern argued that the positive
law should be a floor for Fourth Amendment protections.327 They would
have courts ask, “whether it was unlawful for an ordinary private actor to
do what the government’s agents did.”328 This suggests that understanding
how technology fits into traditional private law concepts, like bailment, is

does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the information is disclosed to the phone company);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank
record).
322. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
323. See generally Matthew Tokson & Ari Ezra Waldman, Social Norms in Fourth Amendment
Law, 120 MICH. L. REV. 265 (2021).
324. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
325. Id. at 34–35, 40.
326. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About Privacy and
the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1119–21 (2014) (reconceptualizing the privacy
violations of electronic surveillance).
327. See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1821 (2016); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–14 (2004). But see
Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of the Right
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889 (2004); Richard M. Re, The
Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. 313 (2016).
328. Baude & Stern, supra note 327, at 1826.
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essential to understanding how the Fourth Amendment interacts with this
technology.329
Justice Gorsuch addressed this question in his dissent in Carpenter.330
He observed how smartphones and other technology have rapidly shifted
how individuals “do most everything.”331 He explained that “[e]ven our
most private documents—those that, in other eras, we would have locked
safely in a desk drawer or destroyed—now reside on third party
servers.”332 Under Smith v. Maryland333 and United States v. Miller,334 the
Fourth Amendment would permit police to search the digitally stored files
without a warrant, “on the theory that no one reasonably expects any of it
will be kept private.”335 The rule in both cases is categorical: any
disclosure to a third party destroys the reasonable expectation of
privacy.336 The problem with this argument, according to Justice Gorsuch,
is that “no one believes that, if they ever did.”337
Justice Gorsuch asked a rhetorical question that highlights the
absurdity of the doctrine: “Can the government demand a copy of all your
e-mails from Google or Microsoft without implicating your
Fourth Amendment rights?”338 Justice Gorsuch emphasized that
“[c]onsenting to give a third party access to private papers that remain my
property is not the same thing as consenting to a search of those papers by
the government.”339 Instead of relying on the third-party doctrine and
fraught notions of privacy, Justice Gorsuch proposes to re-hitch
Fourth Amendment doctrine to the private law.340

329. See Ian Samuel, Carpenter and the Property Vocabulary, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/carpenter-and-the-property-vocabulary/ [https://perma.cc/BY86JJNC] (exploring the usefulness of bailment for Fourth Amendment purposes).
330. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
334. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
335. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
336. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–41.
337. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Case for
the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564 (2009) (describing the third-party doctrine as
“not only wrong, but horribly wrong” and collecting criticism (footnotes omitted)).
338. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch also asked whether
the government can “secure your DNA from 23andMe without a warrant or probable cause?” Id. This
Article will put that second question aside for now because it is possible that there is some distinction
between data that an individual creates and stores with a third party and data that the third party creates
then stores for the individual.
339. Id. at 2263 (emphasis omitted).
340. Id. at 2267–72.
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The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”341 According to Justice Gorsuch, the “original
understanding, the traditional approach asked if a house, paper or effect
was yours under law. No more was needed to trigger the
Fourth Amendment.”342 In this formulation, the common law
determinations of ownership would govern whether the
Fourth Amendment applied to a particular search. This formulation would
all but eliminate the third-party doctrine. Gorsuch offers a series of
colorful examples:
Ever hand a private document to a friend to be returned? Toss
your keys to a valet at a restaurant? Ask your neighbor to look
after your dog while you travel? You would not expect the friend
to share the document with others; the valet to lend your car to his
buddy; or the neighbor to put Fido up for adoption.343
To be sure, these examples all cover tangible goods that have long been
the subject of the doctrine of bailment. But Justice Gorsuch does not
intend to cabin these doctrines to their historical uses or to cases in which
the target of the search owns property in fee simple. He explained that
“[t]hese ancient principles may help us address modern data cases too.
Just because you entrust your data—in some cases, your modern-day
papers and effects—to a third party may not mean you lose any
Fourth Amendment interest in its contents,”344 rather the
Fourth Amendment protects both the “specific rights known at the
founding” and “their modern analogues too.”345
Under Justice Gorsuch’s argument, the applicability of
Fourth Amendment protections to cloud storage should depend, at least in
part, on whether cloud storage is a bailment or at least the modern analog
of a bailment.346 This Article has demonstrated that bailment is the best
way to understand cloud storage, even if cloud storage providers resist
conceiving of themselves as bailees.

341. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
342. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267–68 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
343. Id. at 2268.
344. Id. at 2269.
345. Id. at 2271.
346. See Johnson, supra note 314, at 885–95 (exploring how the Fourth Amendment doctrine maps
onto cloud storage); see also Michael J. O’Connor, Digital Bailments, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1271,
1306–09 (2020) (observing that bailment doctrine might be important to Fourth Amendment doctrine,
but not explaining how bailment would apply to cloud storage).
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The Future of Ownership

Recognizing digital files as something that can be the subject of
bailment may radically transform consumers’ relationship with digital
media. Today, firms structure the contracts facilitating downloads of
books, music, movies, and other media so that consumers have a license
in the media, but not title.347 Consumers may believe that they own these
digital files, but they do not.348 Although there are many critics of this
licensing regime,349 eliminating it may not lead to greater consumer
ownership of digital media. Recall that Holt’s third category of bailment
is hired goods.350 This relationship, which covers equipment rental among
other things, gives consumers use and enjoyment of the goods “without
the burdens of becoming and remaining the owner,” while the lessor
receives rent.351 In a world in which digital files can be bailed, digital
media distributors could restructure their contracts to make consumers
bailees of the media they download. Like someone renting a U-Haul truck,
the consumer could keep the files as long as they paid for it. In this
framework, there would be nothing suspicious about the media distributor
taking its property, the files, back at the termination of the bailment.
Although rooted squarely in property doctrine, a bailments approach to
digital media downloads would be subject to the same criticisms as the
present licensing regime. Namely, it might contradict consumer
expectations and deny consumers autonomy over “their” possessions.
CONCLUSION
Bailment is a relationship between two parties. While it can seem
complex with its many categories and formerly convoluted procedural
rules, the core is quite simple: bailment is the law of entrusting our things
to other people. As a private law doctrine, it gives the force of law to the
trust on which subsequent transactions rely. This much has been true for
at least a millennium. In that time, the doctrine has weathered countless
changes in society, forms of property ownership, and technology. As a
concept, bailment is as flexible as it is essential.

347. See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP:
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016).
348. See Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy Now, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 315, 320–22 (2017).
349. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 347, at 57–81; FAIRFIELD, supra note 161.
350. See supra section I.C.
351. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 776 (N.J. 1965).

D’Onfro (Do Not Delete)

2022]

3/25/2022 9:34 PM

THE NEW BAILMENTS

153

Having robust default rules regarding who can trust whom for what is
efficient. These rules should capture what the parties would negotiate for
if they could negotiate efficiently and without grossly unequal bargaining
power. That is, these rules reflect the expectations of reasonable
individuals. Failure to extend these rules to the emerging digital economy
risks further disconnecting the law from the expectations of society at
large. This disconnect is not good for the legitimacy of the law.
More broadly, any law of technology that skirts the core principles of
private law is the law of suckers. The tech companies will insulate
themselves from responsibility to their customers with contract. The effect
of these contracts will be to bind the consumer alone. Firms will draft
themselves unilateral modification rights and erect procedural barriers to
enforcing any remaining rights. The gist will be that anyone who trusts
technology with something they value is embarrassingly naïve. Sure,
consumers thought they were paying a firm for secure storage, but they
should have read the fine print that said the firm could delete their files at
will—everyone knows to back up their backup. Adding salt to the wound,
the user who fails to have a backup for their backup may even be in breach
of contract if the contract contains precatory terms.352
Reputational concerns may police behavior at the margins but do little
to align the promise of these products with the substance of their contracts.
The companies purport to be storage companies, but then waive liability
for loss of data. Even resources for lawyers helping their business clients
enter into cloud storage contracts warn that there will be broad disclaimers
of liability that may be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate.353
Ceding the large swaths of private law to contracts is a pointless
abdication354—technology fits into the robust doctrinal framework of the
private law. An earlier generation of common law judges might have
recognized this fit through the natural flow of cases. Those days have long
since passed, but that does not mean those common law concepts should
be abandoned. Instead, any statutory law of cloud storage should be built
on the law of bailment, much in the same way that the statutory law of
warehousing is.

352. Hoffman, supra note 295, at 1401–08 (explaining how firms can and do use terms of use to
motivate user behavior).
353. See DAVID W. TOLLEN, THE TECH CONTRACTS HANDBOOK: CLOUD COMPUTING
AGREEMENTS, SOFTWARE LICENSES, AND OTHER IT CONTRACTS FOR LAWYERS AND
BUSINESSPEOPLE 146–49 (2d ed. 2015); OVERLY & KALYVAS, supra note 15.
354. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 893–97 (1988) (pushing back on the idea that contract can explain and therefore govern
fiduciary law).
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